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ABSTRACT 
Creditors of insolvent corporations often ask courts to “pierce the 
corporate veil” and hold shareholders personally liable for a 
corporate obligation.  Veil piercing is the most heavily litigated issue 
in corporate law, yet legal doctrine in this area is notoriously 
incoherent.  Courts typically base their decisions on conclusory 
references to criteria of doubtful relevance.  Results are 
unpredictable.  Similar outcomes are now occurring in cases brought 
against the owners of various kinds of newly sanctioned limited 
liability entities, and so a bad situation is only going to get worse.  In 
this Article, I argue that this state of affairs results from a lack of 
understanding of the policy basis for limited liability.  Once a better 
understanding is achieved, veil piercing can then serve the useful 
function of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate reliance on 
statutory limited liability. 
After surveying efficiency rationales for limited liability and finding 
them unpersuasive, I propose that the best way to understand the 
purpose of limited liability is as a subsidy designed to encourage 
business investment.  The subsidy comes at the expense of corporate 
creditors.  It is easy to see how this is so as to victims of corporate 
torts; limited liability requires that they bear their losses to the extent 
they exceed corporate assets.  It is less obvious that shareholders 
actually gain value from contract creditors, who can insist on 
compensation ex ante for the increased risk of default that limited 
liability entails, but even in this context I argue that recent research in 
behavioral economics suggests that shareholders do benefit at 
creditors’ expense from the statutory limited liability default rule. 
However beneficial the limited liability subsidy may be to corporate 
shareholders and to society more generally, it should not be so broad 
as to protect illegitimate behavior.  In particular, limited liability 
should not provide the occasion for shareholders to behave 
opportunistically toward third parties.  As to contract creditors, that 
means imposition of risk that creditors have not agreed to bear, as, 
for example, when controlling shareholders cause a corporation to 
incur a debt while having no reasonable basis for believing that it 
will be repaid.  Similarly, when corporations engage in activities 
likely to injure others, shareholders act opportunistically if they have 
failed to provide a reasonable amount of compensation, either 
through liability insurance or cash reserves.  As to both contract and 
tort creditors, the key concern is use of limited liability as a device 
deliberately or recklessly to extract value from third parties without 
their consent and without compensation; absent the limited liability 
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shield, such practices could not be effective because business owners 
would bear full responsibility for creditor claims.  Fairness and 
efficiency considerations necessitate denial of limited liability in 
cases of opportunism because the subsidy to investors comes at too 
great a cost to corporate creditors. In particular, if limited liability is 
to protect opportunism, the cost of credit is higher for all corporate 
borrowers because lenders are unable ex ante to discriminate between 
those who are trustworthy and those who are not.  Likewise, tort 
victims bear too heavy a cost if limited liability shields shareholders 
who have failed to insure against third party injuries. 
Limited liability should instead be limited to situations in which 
shareholders have managed the business with due regard for 
bargained-for expectations and potential accident victims.  If 
corporate insolvency has occurred despite the shareholders’ 
reasonable efforts, the limited liability shield should protect them.  In 
other words, the availability of limited liability should depend on 
whether the controlling shareholders have managed the business in a 
financially responsible manner.  Courts confronted with veil piercing 
claims thus should tailor the scope of limited liability to those 
circumstances in which it is warranted according to sound public 
policy.  Deployed in this way, limited liability would protect 
shareholders from the kinds of losses that should be their primary 
concern, namely business insolvency due to causes that could not 
reasonably have been anticipated or prevented: contractual 
obligations that are unpayable because of developments that were 
unforeseen when they were undertaken and tort claims that exceed an 
insurance policy’s reasonably chosen coverage limit.  Limited to 
situations like this, limited liability would still provide investors with 
a significant benefit.  It would therefore continue to facilitate 
corporate law’s business subsidization policy, but the cost of that 
subsidy would be reduced to an amount that respects legitimate 
creditor and societal interests. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Limited liability is a familiar feature of the law governing business 
organizations.  Long the hallmark of corporate status, limited liability protects 
a corporation’s shareholders from personal responsibility for corporate 
obligations.1  This means that a creditor who has a claim arising out of a 
transaction with the corporation may not look to a shareholder for payment 
even if the corporation is insolvent.  Limited liability is not restricted to 
corporations.  Limited partners in limited partnerships also enjoy similar 
protection.2  More recently, a proliferation of new forms of business 
organization offers limited liability in a number of novel contexts.  These 
include most notably the limited liability company3 and also the limited 
liability partnership4 and limited liability limited partnership.5 
The institution of limited liability in corporate law has attracted extensive 
criticism, especially on efficiency grounds.  These concerns have led to 
proposals that limited liability be abolished, at least as to certain types of 
creditor claims.6  Yet despite these arguments, limited liability is alive and 
well.  The various new forms of unincorporated business entities all share the 
limited liability attribute as their principle reason for being.  These 
developments indicate clearly that legislators and policymakers continue to 
value limited liability despite academics’ insistence on its excessive social 
costs. 
 
 1 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (2002) (“[A] shareholder of a corporation is not personally 
liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become personally liable by reason of his own 
acts or conduct.”). 
 2 See, e.g., REV. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303(a) (amended 1985) (“[A] limited partner is not liable for 
the obligations of the partnership unless he is also a general partner or, in addition to the exercise of his rights 
and powers as a limited partner, he participates in the control of the business.”). 
 3 See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 303(a) (1995) (“[T]he debts, obligations, and liabilities of a 
limited liability company . . . are solely the debts, obligations, and liabilities of the company.”). 
 4 See, e.g., REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306(c) (1997) (“An obligation of a partnership incurred while the 
partnership is a limited liability partnership, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, is solely the 
obligation of the partnership.”). 
 5 See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT OF 2001 § 404(c) (2001) (“An obligation of a limited partnership 
incurred while the limited partnership is a limited liability limited partnership, whether arising in contract, tort, 
or otherwise, is solely the obligation of the limited partnership.”). 
 6 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991) (proposing rule of pro rata shareholder liability for corporate 
torts); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991) 
(criticizing limited liability for corporate torts). 
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Although corporate statutes speak in general terms about protection of the 
entity’s shareholders from liability for the corporation’s obligations,7 in fact, 
limited liability has never been as absolute as the statutory texts appear to 
indicate.  Courts have deployed the equitable doctrine of “piercing the 
corporate veil” whenever they have believed it necessary to impose 
shareholder liability despite corporate law’s promise of limited liability.8  
According to Professor Thompson, this is the single most frequently litigated 
issue in corporate law.9 
Veil piercing has been the subject of extensive criticism, and, like limited 
liability itself, there have been calls for its abolition.10  Critics have 
emphasized the apparently unprincipled, ad hoc, and therefore unpredictable 
manner in which courts have deployed this device.11  Nevertheless, it remains a 
prominent feature of corporate law.  The same impulses that have led courts to 
disregard corporate existence to prevent perceived injustice are already 
resulting in the deployment of corporate law veil-piercing analysis to claims 
brought by creditors against the owners of the newly created forms of 
unincorporated limited liability entity.12  Here, too, the decisions are a product 
of judicial initiative rather than statutory text. 
In this Article, I take for granted the political reality that limited liability is 
here to stay.  At the same time, I also assume that courts will continue from 
time to time to disregard statutory limited liability and pierce the entity veil to 
hold business owners personally liable for an obligation of the firm.  In light of 
these assumptions, I seek to bring some order to this severely disheveled area 
of the law by suggesting some basic principles that courts should consider 
when entertaining efforts to impose liability on shareholders.  I ask us to think 
seriously about a coherent rationale for limited liability to come to a principled 
understanding of what its limits ought to be.  Veil piercing can then play an 
 
 7 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (2002) (providing for shareholder limited liability unless 
liability might be warranted by virtue of the shareholder’s own conduct). 
 8 Robert B. Thompson, Agency Law and Asset Partitioning, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1321, 1325 (2003). 
 9 Id. at 1325. 
 10 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479 (2001); Douglas C. 
Michael, To Know a Veil, 26 J. CORP. L. 41 (2001). 
 11 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 12 See, e.g., Hollowell v. Orleans Reg’l Gen. Hosp. LLC, 217 F.3d 379, 385 n.7 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(affirming trial court’s holding that corporate law of veil piercing applies to creditor claims against LLC 
members); Ditty v. CheckRite, Ltd., Inc., 973 F. Supp. 1320, 1335–36 (D. Utah 1997) (“[M]ost commentators 
assume that the [veil-piercing] doctrine applies to limited liability companies.”); Kaycee Land & Livestock v. 
Flahive, 46 P.3d 323, 327 (Wyo. 2002) (“We can discern no reason, in either law or policy, to treat LLCs 
differently than we treat corporations.”). 
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important role by assuring that shareholders do not enjoy the benefit of the 
limited liability shield in cases in which protection is inappropriate. 
Part I of this Article considers the justifications for statutory limited 
liability, which on its face is unqualified.  Because the rule applies to closely as 
well as publicly held corporations and to tort as well as contract creditors, 
limited liability cannot be defended solely on efficiency grounds.  Instead, the 
true policy basis for limited liability seems to be the reallocation of some of the 
costs of doing business from business owners to those who transact 
(voluntarily or involuntarily) with the corporation.  By requiring creditors to 
bear some of these costs, the law in effect requires them to subsidize business 
activity.  This policy does not depend on a clear demonstration of efficiency 
for its legitimacy.  Instead, there seems to be little more at work than an 
unquestioned assumption that the benefits of increased business investment 
will be worth the social costs. 
Courts have recognized that sometimes this subsidization policy can result 
in behavior by business owners that should not be tolerated.13  That has been 
the impetus for development of the “piercing the corporate veil” doctrine that 
denies the limited liability shield to shareholders under certain circumstances.  
The problem, however, is that this incoherent body of case law—which hardly 
deserves the term “doctrine”—has turned out to be an unprincipled 
hodgepodge of seemingly ad hoc and unpredictable results.  I discuss the 
currently dismal state of veil-piercing law in Part II. 
Nonetheless, veil piercing can perform a useful function.  Once the 
appropriate limits of limited liability are understood, veil piercing can police 
those limits.  That understanding, however, depends on a sound sense of the 
policy basis for limited liability, which I develop in Part III.  The key notion is 
that corporate shareholders should enjoy the limited liability shield only if they 
have conducted their business in a financially responsible manner.  If they 
have, and the corporation nevertheless has ended up unable to pay its debts, 
then limited liability is appropriate.  However, limited liability can also 
facilitate opportunistic behavior by shareholders that the law should not 
endorse.14  Sound policy should not allow controlling shareholders to use 
limited liability as a device deliberately or recklessly to extract value from 
third parties without their consent and without compensation.  If shareholders 
can use limited liability for those ends, the subsidy is too generous.  Veil 
 
 13 See cases cited supra note 12. 
 14 See, e.g., infra Part III.A.2. 
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piercing therefore allows courts to tailor limited liability to those cases in 
which it is truly warranted.  Part IV elaborates on how courts should deploy 
veil piercing so as to limit the scope of limited liability to cases of financially 
responsible behavior. 
I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR LIMITED LIABILITY 
A. Efficiency Rationales 
Scholars have identified several efficiency-based rationales for limited 
liability.  Most obviously, limited liability enables aggregation of large 
amounts of capital from numerous small investors.  If liability were not 
limited, even a small investment could render a shareholder liable for a 
substantial corporate obligation.  Many people would be reluctant to risk their 
personal wealth in exchange for the prospect of only a modest return at best; 
even if the venture proves to be wildly successful, the small shareholder can 
claim only a small percentage of the corporation’s gains.15  Because even a 
remote risk of a huge loss may overshadow small gains that are more likely, 
potential investors may forego investments that have a positive net present 
value.16  Limited liability therefore encourages investment that otherwise 
would not occur. 
In addition to facilitating capital formation, limited liability also allows 
shareholders to reduce risk by holding diversified portfolios.  Facing less risk, 
shareholders are willing to settle for a lower rate of return than they would 
demand if liability were unlimited.  Corporations therefore incur lower capital 
costs.17 
Limited liability also saves shareholders the costs involved in attempting to 
protect themselves from unduly risky corporate behavior.  If unlimited liability 
were the rule, shareholders would need to concern themselves with the 
possibility of corporate decisions that could expose them to personal liability.  
 
 15 See MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE LAW 37 (1995).  The assumption here is 
that unlimited liability would be joint and several as in partnership law.  If instead liability were pro rata, the 
risk of loss would be reduced and the disincentive to invest that much less.  See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra 
note 6, at 1892–94. 
 16 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 44 
(1991).  It is assumed that shareholders are risk averse. 
 17 See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 
262–65 (1967). 
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This would necessitate efforts to participate actively in control of the business 
or at least to monitor closely the decisions of the firm’s managers.18  To 
minimize the costs involved in engaging in these kinds of activities, investors 
would need to concentrate their capital in one or perhaps a few ventures.  Even 
then these costs could exceed the expected return on a relatively small 
investment.  With limited liability, however, investors need not concern 
themselves with costly monitoring efforts or participation in management.  
Instead, they can optimize their returns by making smaller investments in a 
larger number of companies.19 
Limited liability also eliminates the need for shareholders to monitor each 
other.  Under a regime of unlimited liability, the likelihood that any single 
shareholder would have to pay a judgment against an insolvent corporation 
would depend in part on the resources of the other shareholders.20  If the 
majority of the shareholders have modest personal wealth, an affluent 
shareholder would end up paying a larger share of the judgment out of his own 
pocket.21  Shareholders would therefore incur costs in attempting to keep track 
of both the identities of their fellow shareholders and also their individual 
wealth. 
Finally, limited liability facilitates the transferability of corporate stock.  If 
liability were unlimited, protection of creditor interests would require either a 
rule prohibiting transfer to low-asset transferees or else a rule exposing the 
transferor to liability after the transfer.22  Either rule would interfere with 
trading activity and could adversely affect the efficient pricing of publicly 
traded shares if the result is a significant reduction in trading volume.23 
 
 18 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16, at 41–42. 
 19 See Manne, supra note 17, at 262. 
 20 See Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock & Stuart Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in 
Corporate Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 123–24 (1980). 
 21 If, however, the unlimited liability rule were pro rata rather than joint and several, this consideration 
would not apply.  See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 1906; Leebron, supra note 6, at 1578–79.  
Despite its theoretical appeal, there are serious practical impediments to a pro rata regime.  See Janet Cooper 
Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1992); 
Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 
387 (1992); see also Manne, supra note 17, at 262. 
 22 See Susan E. Woodward, Limited Liability in the Theory of the Firm, 141 J. INSTITUTIONAL & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 601, 602 (1985). 
 23 Id. at 601–02. 
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B. Relevance of the Efficiency Rationales 
Corporate statutes all confer limited liability in general terms.  As long as 
the shareholder does not do anything to incur personal liability, the limited 
liability shield promises to be effective.  There is no distinction between 
contract- and tort-based claims or between closely held or public 
corporations.24  The enabling acts for the various newer forms of limited 
liability entity are similarly unequivocal.25 
Statutory limited liability is unconditional even though corporate 
governance and ownership structures vary widely, from the closely held firm 
with few owners to the large public corporation with hundreds of thousands of 
shareholders.26  Likewise, limited liability as to contract creditors involves 
different policy considerations than does limited liability for tort-based claims 
because relations between a corporation and a contract creditor are consensual 
while interactions with tort victims generally are not.  If one considers the 
efficiency justifications for limited liability in relation to the range of 
businesses and types of claims to which it is supposed to apply, it is apparent 
that the rationales do not apply equally well to all the instances apparently 
covered by the broad statutory language. 
The argument for limited liability may be less compelling as to 
shareholders of close corporations than as to those of publicly held companies.  
As noted above, limited liability reduces the need for shareholders to monitor 
management’s risk taking.  This is important for public corporation 
shareholders, for whom monitoring is generally not feasible or cost effective as 
a practical matter.  In any event, these investors prefer to manage risk by 
investing passively in a diversified portfolio of companies rather than 
attempting actively to involve themselves in management of one or a few 
companies.  Limited liability therefore facilitates investment in publicly held 
businesses. 
In contrast, however, the typical shareholder in a closely held corporation is 
more likely to be actively involved in or at least attentive to management 
decision making, just as the typical partner in a partnership would be.27  These 
shareholders often have a large portion of their personal wealth invested in the 
 
 24 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 1–5. 
 25 See sources cited supra notes 3–5. 
 26 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 1–5. 
 27 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16, at 55–56. 
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venture and therefore cannot rely on diversification to reduce firm-specific 
risk.28  They may also make substantial human capital investments, which by 
their nature are nondiversifiable.  As a practical matter, it is far easier to 
participate in corporate governance or monitor the activities of the firm’s 
managers in a small-scale enterprise.  Thus, the opportunity and the incentive 
to participate in or monitor the firm’s risk-taking activities are real in the close 
corporation context.  These shareholders are much less likely to benefit from 
the monitoring cost savings that limited liability provides to public corporation 
shareholders.29 
The need to monitor the wealth of one’s fellow shareholders is also less 
costly in the close corporation setting, in which the number of shareholders is 
small and there is often a fair degree of intimacy among the business’s owners.  
In addition, articles of incorporation of closely held firms often include 
restrictions on the transferability of shares to nonshareholders.30  Such 
provisions further reduce the costs involved in monitoring the identity of 
fellow shareholders.  Even if shares are not subject to transferability 
restrictions, the absence of active markets for close corporation stock generally 
makes trading infrequent in any event. 
Finally, in the close corporation setting statutory limited liability may have 
only limited practical value.  Many creditors, especially banks and other 
lenders, but also many suppliers, require a personal guarantee from the 
corporation’s shareholders.31  Trade creditors typically will not request 
personal guarantees, but may be content with security interests in inventory 
they have sold to the business and therefore would not seek recovery from the 
shareholders in any event.32  Contracting practices thus suggest that, in the 
close corporation context, limited liability is not necessarily the efficient rule. 
Tort creditors, of course, do not have an opportunity to bargain ex ante for 
personal guarantees or other protections.  Judgments can be very large and can 
easily exceed the assets of the corporation.  This kind of risk, however, is 
 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 
INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 577 (8th ed. 2003) (share transfer restrictions 
widely used). 
 31 WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 142 (8th ed. 
2002). 
 32 ROBERT W. HAMILTON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: UNINCORPORATED BUSINESSES AND CLOSELY 
HELD CORPORATIONS 319 n.7 (1996). 
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typically insurable, and given the omnipresent risk of veil piercing in cases of 
underinsurance, prudent shareholders of closely held firms generally will cause 
the corporation to purchase liability insurance despite the statutory promise of 
limited liability.33  Insurance has the effect of limiting shareholder liability 
regardless of the statutory rule, again suggesting that statutory limited liability 
is not necessarily efficient in this context. 
In addition to being weaker in the case of the close corporation versus the 
public one, the case for limited liability is also more problematic for tort claims 
than for obligations arising out of contract.  Limited liability is supposed to 
allow shareholders to externalize the risk of corporate insolvency that they 
would otherwise have to bear themselves.  However, voluntary creditors who 
are aware that they are dealing with a limited liability entity can factor that 
consideration into their decisions about the appropriate interest rate.34  They 
can also bargain for personal guarantees, security interests in particular assets, 
or contractual provisions that limit the corporation’s freedom to engage in 
conduct that would increase the risk of default on their claims.  Such 
protections can include restrictions on distributions, minimum assets 
requirements, and defined debt equity ratios.  Accordingly, bargained-for 
outcomes may be the same regardless of whether limited liability is the default 
rule. 
Involuntary, or tort, creditors are in a quite different situation.  The 
pedestrian hit by a taxi cab or the victim of a toxic waste spill has not agreed to 
assume the risk of corporate insolvency and shareholders’ limited liability.  He 
has not received ex ante compensation for doing so or had the opportunity to 
bargain for contractual safeguards.  The owners of a limited liability entity 
therefore are in a position to shift some of the social costs of their business 
activity onto members of the public who have not agreed to bear those costs.  
As long as an activity holds some promise of increasing shareholder wealth, 
limited liability encourages shareholders (or their representatives) to undertake 
it without regard for the magnitude of possible social costs, which may be far 
greater than the benefits to the owners themselves.35  In this respect, limited 
 
 33 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16, at 48. 
 34 E.g., id. at 51; Leebron, supra note 6, at 1584. 
 35 E.g., Leebron, supra note 6, at 1605; Nina A. Mendelson, A Control–Based Approach to Shareholder 
Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1233–35 (2002).  More specifically, expected return 
need only exceed the amount of shareholder capital exposed to the risk of creditor claims. 
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liability for tort claims creates a moral hazard problem and results in inefficient 
resource allocation decisions.36 
Generally speaking, economic analysis indicates that limited liability is 
advantageous for shareholders of public corporations but much less so if the 
company is closely held.  Economic analysis also indicates that it may have 
limited practical significance in dealings with contract creditors, regardless of 
whether the debtor corporation is publicly or closely held.  As to tort creditors, 
limited liability creates incentives to externalize costs that exceed any benefits 
to the shareholders themselves.  Corporate law’s blanket provision of limited 
liability, which is also a feature of the statutes authorizing the other forms of 
limited liability entity, cannot be justified on efficiency grounds alone. 
C. Subsidization Through Risk Reallocation 
The real policy basis for limited liability does not appear to be efficiency.  
Instead, the goal seems to be to promote investment by transferring risk from 
investors to creditors.37  Commercial activity can generate a range of social 
benefits, including financial returns to investors, jobs for employees, and 
desirable products and services for consumers.  The general public also 
benefits from tax revenues and, less directly but no less importantly from the 
advantages of ongoing technological progress stimulated by competitive 
markets.  Limited liability is an important incentive because individuals will 
more willingly take on the risk of business failure if their exposure to loss is 
limited to their actual investment.  Limited liability therefore encourages 
entrepreneurial activity by attempting to shift the risk of corporate insolvency 
from shareholders to the business’s creditors.  More often than not creditors 
will be paid their due and thus will share in the social benefits of commercial 
enterprise, but sometimes they will have to bear the costs of business 
bankruptcy.  Their losses therefore represent a subsidy that encourages 
business investment by lowering its cost.  The social utility of this policy is 
simply taken for granted because actual demonstration of its efficiency is 
technologically impossible. 
 
 36 See infra Part III.A.2.c for further discussion. 
 37 For discussion of nineteenth-century developments, see JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF 
THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780–1970, at 26–28 (1970). 
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1. Contract Creditors 
The risk reallocation or subsidy policy views limited liability as a benefit 
that the law confers on corporate shareholders.  They are relieved of 
responsibility for their firm’s obligations in the event of business failure.  
According to this view, owners of limited liability entities gain an advantage 
not available to sole proprietors or partners in general partnerships. 
As far as contract creditors are concerned, this assumption appears at first 
glance to reflect a large measure of economic naiveté.  According to orthodox 
economic theory, in the absence of transaction costs the initial choice between 
alternative default rules (such as limited liability versus unlimited liability) has 
no effect on the terms of the agreement reached by the parties.38  They will 
bargain to the efficient result in either case and that result will be the same 
regardless of the initial default rule.39 
Further, the notion of limited liability as a benefit or subsidy conferred by 
corporate law upon shareholders disregards the possibility that creditors will 
factor the risk posed by limited liability (namely, that they will not get paid if 
the firm fails) into the interest rates they charge to corporate debtors.40  
Creditors, thus, have the ability to make shareholders pay for the benefit, just 
as shareholders would have to do if unlimited liability were the default rule and 
it were necessary for them to bargain for an agreement to look only to the 
assets of the firm for payment.  In this respect, limited liability resembles other 
default rules—like warranties implied in sales of goods transactions or 
residential leases, or the employer’s right to terminate an employee without 
cause—that appear to improve the position of one class of parties to a common 
form of transaction but in fact may not.  Because limited liability for 
contractual obligations can only take effect when incorporated into an 
agreement resulting from bargaining between the parties, creditors cannot be 
compelled to accept the full cost of limited liability against their will.41  
Accordingly, the initial specification of a default rule will have no effect on the 
value to the parties of the outcome of their bargain; the choice between 
alternative rules does not affect the magnitude of the gains from trade or the 
 
 38 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 39 See id.  For this argument applied to limited liability, see Roger E. Meiners, James S. Mofsky & 
Robert D. Tollison, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351 (1979). 
 40 See supra text accompanying note 34. 
 41 The same point would apply to mandatory contract rules. 
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parties’ respective shares of that surplus.42  According to this view, a limited 
liability default rule does not increase shareholder wealth at the expense of 
creditors.43 
A closer look at the matter, however, may validate legislators’ intuition that 
statutory limited liability improves outcomes for shareholders at creditors’ 
expense.  Recent research in behavioral economics suggests that the choice 
between alternative default rules can affect the behavior of parties to a bargain.  
More specifically, the intended beneficiaries of a default rule44 may be better 
off than they would be if the default rule were the opposite.  According to this 
view, those who benefit from a default rule tend to value that benefit more 
highly than they would if the default rule were the opposite and it were 
necessary to bargain for the benefit.  That phenomenon in turn can result in 
better outcomes for a rule’s beneficiaries.  If this is so, the starting point—one 
default rule or the other—may make a difference in the distribution of the 
surplus generated by a bargain.  Limited liability as to contract creditors may 
represent a subsidy after all. 
The basis for this view is the phenomenon known as the “endowment 
effect.”45  Numerous experiments have demonstrated that people tend to 
 
 42 See Richard Craswell, Passing on the Cost of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer–Seller 
Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991); Harold Demsetz, Wealth Distribution and the Ownership of Legal 
Rights, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 223 (1972).  In this respect, contractual default rules appear to differ from property 
entitlements.  While the initial assignment of a property entitlement may make no difference as far as the 
allocation of resources is concerned, that choice typically will have distributional consequences.  See, e.g., 
JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 71 (1988); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 14 (3d ed. 2003). 
 43 See, e.g., DOOLEY, supra note 15, at 37 (Where transaction costs are low, “any rule regarding 
shareholders’ liability for firm debts will have little effect on the terms of the transaction because the parties 
will simply agree to allocate risk and return to suit their individual preferences.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 412 (6th ed. 2003) (voluntary creditors fully compensated for increased risk of 
default by higher interest rate). 
 44 The notion of a default rule’s “beneficiary” is based on the fact that default rules typically express a 
bias in favor of one party to a contract and against the other.  For example, the limited liability default rule 
provides that shareholders enjoy protection from claims of corporate creditors, unless otherwise agreed; or, the 
at-will rule in employment law provides that employers can discharge employees for any reason, unless 
otherwise agreed.  In this respect, one can speak of one class of contracting parties (shareholders vs. corporate 
creditors; employers vs. employees) as the beneficiary of the relevant default rule.  Of course, default rules can 
be reversed by agreement of the parties and any benefit may have to be paid for, and so default rule bias does 
not necessarily confer any actual benefit on its beneficiary.  The idea of default rule bias simply expresses the 
initial tilt or advantage of the rule.  For further discussion of “default-rule bias,” see David Millon, Default 
Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform: Employment At Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. 
L. REV. 975, 990–92 (1998). 
 45 According to Professor Korobkin, Professor Richard Thaler introduced this term.  Russell Korobkin, 
The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1228 n.3 (2003) (citing Richard Thaler, 
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demand more money if they are selling a piece of property or other entitlement 
than they would be willing to pay for the same item or right if they did not 
already own it.46  These results appear to reflect a more general, well-
documented tendency for people to place a higher value on their current status 
or circumstances than they would place on that same status or circumstances if 
their condition were different.  This disposition is referred to as “status quo 
bias.”47 
The extensive research documenting the endowment effect has focused 
primarily on subjects’ valuation of property rights or other legal entitlements.  
Whether the endowment effect also applies to contractual default rules presents 
a different question.  This is so because such rules differ fundamentally from 
property rights, which provide their owners with the opportunity to enjoy 
assets or other goods.  In contrast, default rules confer no benefits and impose 
no duties on anyone until they are actually incorporated into a contract with 
another party.  Apart from their inclusion in a contract, default rules confer no 
entitlements.48  Despite this difference, experimental evidence indicates that 
 
Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980)).  Professor Kennedy 
referred to the endowment effect phenomenon as “the offer-asking problem.”  Duncan Kennedy, Cost–Benefit 
Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 401 (1981). 
 46 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect 
and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence 
of Nonreversible Indifference Curves, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1277 (1989); Jack L. Knetsch & J.A. Sinden, 
Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in 
Measures of Value, 99 Q.J. ECON. 507 (1984).  For a useful display of experimental results in tabular form, see 
Kahneman et al., supra, at 1327 tbl.1.  For general discussions of experimental data on the endowment effect, 
see John K. Horowitz & Kenneth E. McConnell, A Review of WTA/WTP Studies, 44 J. ENVTL. ECON. & 
MGMT. 426 (2002) (surveying forty-five studies); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, 
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991); 
Korobkin, supra note 45. 
 47 “Status quo bias” is related to the endowment effect but refers to the larger notion that people tend to 
prefer the way things are now to possible alternative states.  Among other things, this idea suggests that an 
individual who owns an asset is likely to value that asset more highly than if he did not own it and was 
thinking about buying it.  Korobkin, supra note 45, at 1228–29 (citing William Samuelson & Richard 
Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988)).  For studies, see, e.g., 
JUDD HAMMACK & GARDNER MALLARD BROWN, JR., WATERFOWL AND WETLANDS 26–27 (1974) (value 
placed on duck habitat dependent on whether subjects enjoyed the right to hunt ducks or would have to pay to 
obtain that right); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
341 (1984) (finding differences in preferences for a job depending on whether subjects held the job or another 
one); Raymond S. Hartman, Michael J. Doane & Chi-Keung Woo, Consumer Rationality and the Status Quo, 
106 Q.J. ECON. 141 (1991) (variations in value placed on reliable electrical service depending on whether 
subjects enjoyed such service or not). 
 48 For this reason, Professor Korobkin refers to the benefit expressed in a default rule as a “quasi-
endowment,” Korobkin, supra note 45, at 1270, or “illusory entitlement.”  Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo 
Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 631 (1998). 
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the endowment effect is at work in the valuation of contractual default rules as 
well as property rights.49  In the context of this Article, this means that the 
beneficiary of a default rule may value that contract term (e.g., limited 
liability) more highly than he would if the default rule were the opposite 
(unlimited liability) and it were necessary to bargain around the default term to 
obtain its inverse.  This valuation disparity therefore would lead a party to 
demand more compensation for waiver of a right expressed in a default rule 
than he would be willing to pay to obtain that right if the default rule were the 
opposite. 
Does the existence of an endowment effect in the context of default rules 
allow legislators to benefit particular classes of individuals by choosing 
between alternative defaults?  More specifically, is it possible to advantage 
shareholders at the expense of contract creditors by ordaining a limited liability 
default rule?  The answer to these questions is not yet clearly established.  
However, the likely existence of an endowment effect encourages the 
assumption that, under the current limited liability default rule regime, 
shareholders value that contract term more highly than they would if the 
default were unlimited liability.  If so, it is plausible to suppose that the limited 
liability default affects the distribution of wealth between shareholders and 
corporate creditors. 
When corporate creditors and shareholders deal with each other, some 
shareholders and creditors contract around the default, replacing it with 
shareholders’ personal guarantees, while others do not.  For those who do, the 
shareholders receive compensation (in the form of a lower interest rate).  
Because the limited liability default rule influences shareholders’ valuation of 
that contract term, they should expect to receive compensation for waiver of 
that right in these cases.  This consideration would not be present if the default 
rule were unlimited liability.  As a result, even though the possibility of 
shareholder personal liability will always mean lower interest rates in 
comparison to contracts with limited liability, shareholders should end up with 
a better deal if the default rule is limited liability than if unlimited liability 
were the default instead.50 
 
 49 Korobkin, supra note 48, at 633–47 (describing results of experimental contract negotiations involving 
several contract terms in light of alternative default rules); Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 106, 113–14 (2002) (describing results of experiment involving negotiation over contract term 
in context of alternative default rules). 
 50 For example, suppose that, under a limited liability default rule, a contract including an unlimited 
liability term bears a 10% interest rate.  In that case, to get to the unlimited liability contract required that the 
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Again assuming that the default is limited liability, the parties may reach an 
agreement that includes limited liability rather than contracting around the 
default rule.51  In these cases shareholders may also end up better off than if 
the default were unlimited liability.  If unlimited liability were the default, the 
shareholders would need to bargain and pay for the limited liability shield.  
Because creditors would place a higher value on unlimited liability if it were 
the default rule, shareholders would have to pay a premium to persuade 
creditors to accept limited liability.  This premium would not be demanded if 
the default were limited liability because both parties would behave as if 
shareholders already “owned” the limited liability term.52 
Professors Sunstein and Korobkin have suggested that, in complex 
contracts with several terms, adjustments to other terms of the contract may 
offset any distributional gains that result from a default rule’s bias in favor of 
one party.53  For example, if the employment law default rule were discharge 
for cause only (rather than the law’s current employment at-will default), an 
employee would not have to pay an employer to waive a default-rule-based 
“entitlement” to discharge employees at will.  However, some other term of the 
contract could be adjusted—such as reduction in the hourly wage or amount of 
paid vacation—so as to provide the employer with the same value that it would 
enjoy if employment at will were the default and employees seeking just-cause 
contracts would have to pay for that benefit.  If so, the distributional outcome 
would be the same regardless of the default rule.54 
 
creditor compensate the shareholders for their “waiver” of the limited liability term expressed in the default 
rule.  Because this consideration would not be present under an unlimited liability default (i.e., no need to pay 
shareholders to give up their default-rule-based “entitlement” to limited liability), the result should be an 
interest rate higher than 10%.  Shareholders thus are better off under the limited liability default. 
 51 The endowment effect will tend to make a default term “sticky” because the higher value placed on the 
term by its beneficiary will make it harder for the parties to reach agreement on the alternative rule.  Korobkin, 
supra note 45, at 1272. 
 52 For example, assume that under an unlimited liability default rule, a contract including limited liability 
bears a 15% interest rate.  In this case, shareholders must pay the creditor to “waive” its potential claim against 
their personal wealth.  Because this factor would not apply under a limited liability default (i.e., there would be 
no need to pay the creditor to give up its unlimited liability “entitlement”), the result should be an interest rate 
lower than 15%.  Again, shareholders are better off under the limited liability default. 
 53 Sunstein, supra note 49, at 126; Korobkin, supra note 45, at 1278. 
 54 Sunstein, supra note 49, at 126 (“If employees are given an entitlement, whether alienable or 
inalienable, the rest of the contract package is likely to be adjusted accordingly.”); Korobkin, supra note 45, at 
1278 (“If the law provides a just-cause default, and the endowment effect then causes employees to be 
reluctant to part with it, the likely consequence is a lower salary or fewer other benefits than employees would 
enjoy under an at-will term.”). 
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The problem with this suggestion is that it may not take the endowment 
effect seriously enough.  For example, if the default rule were unlimited 
liability and the parties bargain to a contract with limited liability, shareholders 
must compensate the creditor by some amount x for giving up what it perceives 
as a valuable entitlement.  In contrast, however, if the default rule is limited 
liability and bargaining results in a limited liability contract, the creditor has no 
expectation or basis for claiming x because, in light of the endowment effect, it 
has not yielded a valuable right.  There is no reason for the creditor to expect 
an identical outcome in both situations because the endowment effect—
internalized by both parties regardless of which way the default rule tilts—
leads it to view the two scenarios as fundamentally different.  That being the 
case, there is no reason to assume that the creditor, working in the context of a 
limited liability default, will demand value equivalent to what it would have 
been able to realize under an unlimited liability default.55 
There is some empirical support for the endowment effect’s distributional 
impact on bargaining in the context of default rules.56  In addition, Professor 
Jolls has shown that, under certain conditions, mandatory contract terms can 
benefit classes of workers without offsetting declines in wages or levels of 
employment.57  To the extent that the endowment effect leads people to behave 
as if default rules confer entitlements, Professor Jolls’s analysis offers some 
support for the possibility of wealth redistribution through the selection of 
default rules. 
 
 55 Furthermore, even if the parties did view the two scenarios as identical and therefore warranting 
identical distributional outcomes, a typical credit transaction differs from the employment contract discussed 
by Sunstein and Korobkin in ways that probably make it much harder to reach that result.  See Sunstein, supra 
note 49, at 126; Korobkin, supra note 45, at 1278.  The credit transaction is partly executed and relatively 
simple.  The creditor has performed its part of the bargain by handing over money or extending credit to the 
debtor.  In return, the debtor has promised future performance in the form of payments of interest and 
principal.  In contrast, the employment agreement is wholly executory and much more complex, consisting of 
an exchange of promises on a wide range of matters besides price.  Credit transactions therefore do not present 
the same opportunities for adjustment of non-price terms (such as the package of non-wage benefits) to offset 
an interest rate perceived by the creditor to be too low. 
 56 Professor Schwab’s labor negotiation experiment yielded more valuable outcomes for one party or the 
other (union versus employer) depending on whether a default rule (governing the employer’s right to transfer 
work to a nonunion plant) favored the union or the employer.  Bargaining over wages, number of vacation 
days, and the employer’s right to transfer work, union negotiators obtained better outcomes when the default 
rule was no-transfer than they did when the default was right-to-transfer.  Correspondingly, the employer fared 
better when the default allowed freedom to transfer.  Stewart  Schwab, A Coasean Experiment on Contract 
Presumptions, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (1988). 
 57 Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223 (2000) (analyzing economic effects 
of mandates designed to benefit particular classes of employees). 
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Even with the impressive research on the endowment effect that has been 
done in recent years, the distributive effects of default rule choice have yet to 
be conclusively established.  Further empirical work is needed, and it will be 
necessary to attend to the possibility of different results depending on context.  
What can be said, though, is that there now appears to be a theoretical basis for 
thinking that the limited liability default rule provides a benefit to shareholders 
that they would not enjoy under a regime of unlimited liability.  There may be 
something to the notion of subsidy after all. 
Even if legislators are correct in believing that limited liability can benefit 
shareholders in their dealings with the corporation’s contract creditors, that 
benefit can generate social costs beyond the transfer of the risk of corporate 
insolvency from business owners to creditors.  As explained more fully below, 
limited liability can facilitate shareholder opportunism toward the 
corporation’s contract creditors.58  Creditors may therefore end up incurring 
losses that they have not agreed to bear.  To the extent that these losses exceed 
the necessary costs of a reasonable business subsidization policy, the limited 
liability shield is broader than this rationale warrants. 
2. Tort Creditors 
The distributional benefits of limited liability are more obvious as to 
victims of corporate torts.  Protection from personal liability allows corporate 
shareholders to limit their liability for personal injuries and other harms caused 
by business activity to their capital contributions.  To the extent that a business 
lacks the financial wherewithal to compensate tort claimants fully for their 
losses, those doing business in the corporate form are able to shift that cost 
from themselves over to the injured parties.  These cases differ from those 
involving contract creditors because there has been no opportunity for 
bargaining ex ante.  Accordingly, there is no possibility that tort creditors have 
received compensation for bearing the risk of limited liability.  By allowing 
entrepreneurs to externalize these costs of doing business, limited liability 
provides a subsidy paid for by uncompensated tort victims. 
As with contract creditors, however, it is likely that this policy goes too far 
and invites behavior that should in fact be discouraged. The incentive to 
undertake risky activities without worrying about whether social costs exceed 
private benefits means that shareholders will likely cause their corporations to 
 
 58 See discussion infra Part III.A.2.a–b. 
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engage in potentially harmful conduct that they would be reluctant to pursue in 
the absence of the limited liability shield.59  Even if limited liability has a 
desirable role to play in the encouragement of legitimate risk taking, the shield 
may be also facilitate socially undesirable behavior and to that extent is 
overbroad. 
II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF VEIL-PIERCING DOCTRINE 
Statutory limited liability, which on its face applies to close corporations as 
well as public ones and to tort as well as contract claims, is too broad to be 
justified solely on efficiency grounds.  Its true rationale seems instead to be the 
encouragement of business investment through risk reallocation.  In that sense, 
limited liability is designed to provide a subsidy for entrepreneurial activity by 
shifting costs to creditors that business owners would otherwise have to bear 
themselves. 
Despite the generality of corporate law’s statutory rule, limited liability has 
never been as absolute as it purports to be.  From time to time, courts 
acknowledge the need for constraints on the availability of the limited liability 
shield to prevent shareholders from using it to achieve illegitimate ends.  In 
effect, courts have said that limited liability’s subsidy can come at too high a 
price and, in such cases, have refused to impose its cost on corporate creditors. 
To accomplish this objective, courts have fashioned the so-called “piercing 
the corporate veil” doctrine.60  Under certain circumstances, courts will 
disregard or puncture the limited liability shield to hold shareholders 
personally responsible for obligations the corporation itself lacks the capacity 
to discharge.  Because the same misgivings about the appropriate breadth of 
statutory limited liability can arise in cases involving the various new forms of 
limited liability entity, courts have begun the process of developing analogous 
doctrines for the benefit of creditors bringing claims against business owners in 
appropriate cases.61 
 
 59 See infra Part III.A.2.c. 
 60 Professor Presser’s treatise on the subject sheds no light on the origins of the term but does trace its 
popularity to a seminal law review article published in 1912.  See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE 
CORPORATE VEIL § 1.01 n.7 (2003) (citing I. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 
COLUM. L. REV. 496 (1912)). 
 61 See cases cited supra note 12 (noting veil-piercing cases involving limited liability companies). 
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As it has developed judicially, veil piercing has been the subject of sharp 
criticism.  In this Part, I consider the bases for those criticisms, which are 
surely justified.  I believe, however, that veil piercing could serve a useful 
function if there were a sound understanding of the policy basis for limited 
liability.  Only with the benefit of such an understanding is it then possible to 
define clearly the appropriate limits on limited liability.  These questions are 
taken up in Part III. 
A. Veil Piercing and Economic Analysis 
Judge Easterbrook and Dean Fischel have suggested that the incidence of 
veil piercing can be explained by reference to efficiency considerations.  They 
write, “[T]he doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, and the distinctions drawn 
by courts, makes more economic sense than at first appears.  The cases may be 
understood, at least roughly, as attempts to balance the benefits of limited 
liability against its costs.”62  Even this guarded a statement wildly exaggerates 
the logic behind the case law in this area. 
Courts apparently never hold shareholders of publicly held corporations 
personally liable for corporate obligations, regardless of the distinction 
between contract and tort claims.63  In the few reported cases in which tort 
claimants have attempted to pierce the veil of public corporations,64 the 
opinions pay no attention to the economic arguments against limited liability as 
to involuntary creditors.  This is so even though, as we have seen, thoughtful 
analysis of the rationale for limited liability would seem to indicate willingness 
to pierce in cases brought by involuntary creditors because these plaintiffs 
never agreed to accept the risk of nonpayment due to corporate insolvency and 
limited shareholder liability.65  At the same time, economic orthodoxy argues 
that courts ought generally to respect limited liability where creditors have 
assumed that risk voluntarily and presumably accepted compensation for doing 
so.  For voluntary creditors, shareholder liability should be possible only if 
there has been misrepresentation as to corporate status. 
In contrast to cases involving publicly held corporations, courts pierce the 
veil of close corporations with some frequency.  Such cases reflect skepticism 
 
 62 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16, at 55. 
 63 See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 
1036, 1047 (1991). 
 64 Professor Thompson references nine cases in which courts refused to hold shareholders of publicly 
held corporations liable for corporate obligations.  Id. at 1047 n.71. 
 65 See supra Part I.B. 
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about the need for limited liability in the close corporation setting.  However, 
even as to one-person corporations, reported opinions hold shareholders 
personally liable only about half the time, and where there is more than one 
shareholder they do so even less often.66  Given the doubtful efficiency 
justification for limited liability in the close corporation context,67 economic 
analysis would seem to indicate a much greater willingness to pierce than in 
fact is the case. 
The close corporation cases that do entertain piercing claims generally do 
not take seriously the distinction between contract and tort claims.  As 
discussed above,68 the justification for piercing is weaker in the contract setting 
because of the opportunity for ex ante bargaining over risk allocation.  In fact, 
however, courts disregard the corporate shield more often in contract cases 
than in tort cases.69  A number of these contract cases involve shareholder 
misrepresentation and therefore may warrant disregard of the parties’ risk 
allocation agreement, but most do not.70  Even if the misrepresentation cases 
are set to one side, courts still pierce more often in contract than in tort cases.71  
In sum, the actual incidence of veil piercing has little to do with the logic of 
efficiency. 
B. The Unweighted Laundry List 
When one attempts to rationalize the piercing cases according to some 
other set of values, one encounters a dismal morass of repetitive rhetoric 
masking conclusory evaluation.  The cases typically list a series of more or less 
standard factors.  Little if anything is said about how they are to be weighted or 
which ones are necessary or sufficient by themselves to support a piercing 
result.72 
 
 66 See Thompson, supra note 63, at 1055. 
 67 See supra Part I.B. 
 68 See supra text accompanying note 34. 
 69 See Thompson, supra note 63, at 1068. 
 70 Courts pierced the corporate veil in 327 of the 779 contract cases in Professor Thompson’s data set but 
cited misrepresentation in only 98 of the cases that held shareholders personally liable.  Id. at 1069. 
 71 Id. at 1069.  Professor Thompson’s data indicate the error in Judge Easterbrook and Dean Fischel’s 
assertion that “[c]ourts are more willing to disregard the corporate veil in tort than in contract cases.”  
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16, at 58. 
 72 According to Professor Presser, the unweighted laundry list approach owes a substantial debt to a 
treatise, published in 1931, on the liability of parent corporations for the debts of their subsidiaries.  See 
PRESSER, supra note 60, at § 1:6 (discussing FREDERICK J. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS: 
LIABILITY OF A PARENT CORPORATION FOR THE OBLIGATIONS OF ITS SUBSIDIARY (1931)). 
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A Fourth Circuit opinion (applying South Carolina law) involving a one-
person corporation illustrates the vagueness with which courts have formulated 
the doctrine in this area: 
[P]roof of plain fraud is not a necessary element in a finding to 
disregard the corporate entity . . . .  [E]qually as well settled . . . is the 
rule that the mere fact that all or almost all of the corporate stock is 
owned by one individual or a few individuals, will not afford 
sufficient grounds for disregarding corporateness.  But when 
substantial ownership of all stock of a corporation in a single 
individual is combined with other factors clearly supporting 
disregard of the corporate fiction on grounds of fundamental equity 
and fairness, courts have experienced “little difficulty” and have 
shown no hesitancy in applying what is described as the “alter ego” 
or “instrumentality” theory in order to cast aside the corporate shield 
and to fasten liability on the individual stockholder . . . . 
But, in applying the “instrumentality” or “alter ego” doctrine, the 
courts are concerned with reality and not form, with how the 
corporation operated and the individual defendant’s relationship to 
that operation . . . .  [T]he authorities have indicated certain facts 
which are to be given substantial weight in this connection.  One fact 
which all the authorities consider significant in the inquiry, and 
particularly so in the case of the one-man or closely held corporation, 
is whether the corporation was grossly undercapitalized for the 
purposes of the corporate undertaking . . . .  And, “[t]he obligation to 
provide adequate capital begins with incorporation and is a 
continuing obligation thereafter . . . during the corporation’s 
operations.”  Other factors that are emphasized in the application of 
the doctrine are failure to observe corporate formalities, non-payment 
of dividends, the insolvency of the debtor corporation at the time, 
siphoning of funds of the corporation by the dominant stockholder, 
non-functioning of other officers or directors, absence of corporate 
records, and the fact that the corporation is merely a facade for the 
operations of the dominant stockholder or stockholders.  The 
conclusion to disregard the corporate entity may not, however, rest 
on a single factor, whether undercapitalization, disregard of 
corporation’s formalities, or what-not, but must involve a number of 
such factors; in addition, it must present an element of injustice or 
fundamental unfairness.73 
 
 73 DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 684–87 (4th Cir. 1976) 
(citations and footnotes omitted).  For another example of a decision purporting to rely on an unweighted list 
of six of the factors mentioned in DeWitt (some stated in somewhat different language), see Baatz v. Arrow 
Bar: 
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This passage refers to most of the factors that courts have relied on in this 
area.74  Note, however, the lack of guidance as to relative importance.  Note 
also the use of terms—like alter ego, undercapitalization, injustice, and 
unfairness—that are far from self-defining in this context. 
Professor Thompson’s extensive study of piercing cases offers some insight 
into the factors that courts consider relatively more important than others.  
Aside from misrepresentation, which almost always leads to piercing, the 
considerations that most often result in denial of limited liability—
approximately 90% or more of the time —are that the corporation was a mere 
“instrumentality” of its shareholders or their “alter ego” or “dummy.”75  A 
finding that an agency relationship existed between the shareholder defendants 
and the corporation is similarly significant.76  However, the plain fact of 
shareholder control or domination of a close corporation generally is not 
sufficient by itself to justify piercing the corporate veil, presumably because at 
least some shareholders inevitably run the business and make the decisions that 
have resulted in the creditor’s loss.77  Similarly, overlap of identity between 
shareholders and directors or shareholders and officers is insufficient without 
more to justify a piercing result.78 
Other factors that courts typically claim to be significant turn out to be 
somewhat less important than these.  A finding of undercapitalization results in 
piercing at a rate of seventy-three percent, and only two thirds of cases 
 
Factors that indicate injustices and inequitable consequences and allow a court to pierce the 
corporate veil are: 
1)  fraudulent representation by corporation directors; 
2)  undercapitalization; 
3)  failure to observe corporate formalities; 
4)  absence of corporate records; 
5)  payment by the corporation of individual obligations; or 
6)  use of the corporation to promote fraud, injustice, or illegalities. 
452 N.W.2d 138, 141 (S.D. 1990). 
 74 One factor not mentioned in this list is an agency relationship between the controlling shareholders and 
the corporate entity.  If the corporation is merely the agent for the shareholder principals, piercing may be 
warranted as a matter of agency law principles.  For discussion, see infra Part II.C.1. 
 75 See Thompson, supra note 63, at 1063 tbl.11. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Professor Thompson finds that cases mentioning shareholder domination and control result in piercing 
only 56.99% of the time.  Id. 
 78 Id. 
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mentioning failure to observe corporate formalities actually end with a 
judgment against the shareholder defendants.79 
Even knowing this much, it is still quite difficult to predict when courts 
will pierce the corporate veil and when not.  The unweighted laundry list 
method, combined with the inherent vagueness of many of the items on the list, 
gives the cases an ad hoc, fluky aspect.  Judge Easterbrook’s assessment is apt: 
Such an approach, requiring courts to balance many imponderables, 
all important but none dispositive and frequently lacking in a 
common metric to boot, is quite difficult to apply because it avoids 
formulating a real rule of decision.  This keeps people in the dark 
about the legal consequences of their acts . . . .80 
In place of careful analysis of the facts and their relevance to well-articulated 
doctrinal principles and policy considerations, results often seem conclusory 
and based on the court’s instinctive reaction to the morality of the defendant’s 
conduct.  Injustice and unfairness are often mentioned but rarely defined.81  
One commentator has referred to this approach as “jurisprudence by metaphor 
or epithet.”82  Emphasizing veil piercing’s lack of clarity and predictability, 
Judge Easterbrook and Dean Fischel state, “‘Piercing’ seems to happen 
freakishly.  Like lightning, it is rare, severe, and unprincipled.  There is 
consensus that the whole area of limited liability, and conversely of piercing 
the corporate veil, is among the most confusing in corporate law.”83 
C. Critique of the Factors 
1. Agents, Instrumentalities, and Alter Egos 
Epithets or characterizations like “agent,” “instrumentality,” “alter ego,” 
and “dummy” focus on the quality or nature of the relationship between the 
corporation and its shareholders.  The emphasis is on the fact that one or more 
controlling shareholders dominate decision making regarding the corporation’s 
 
 79 Id. 
 80 Secon Serv. Sys., Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co., 855 F.2d 406, 414 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 81 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 73. 
 82 PHILIP L. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF 
PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 8 (1983). 
 83 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 
89, 89 (1985); see also William J. Callison, Rationalizing Limited Liability and Veil Piercing, 58 BUS. LAW 
1063, 1069 (“[I]t is difficult to discern any overarching doctrine that assists in determining when the limited 
liability veil will be pierced and when it will not.”). 
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business activities.  Under the circumstances, justice is said to require that 
these shareholders be held responsible for third-party losses resulting from 
their exercise of control.  Courts thus use these terms to express a moral 
intuition that shareholders have somehow acted illegitimately by using their 
powers of control to cause the creditor’s loss. 
Two different ideas are actually at work here.  First, courts may speak as if 
the key question is whether the corporate entity really has something like a will 
of its own separate from that of the shareholders or instead is just a mindless 
lackey faithfully doing the controlling shareholders’ bidding.  Shareholder 
liability for corporate obligations may also be thought to turn on whether the 
corporation really has an existence separate from that of its shareholders. 
Some cases purport to rely on agency law ideas as a basis for veil 
piercing.84  A creditor who has dealt with a corporation rather than its 
shareholders has suffered a loss that was arguably the result of the 
shareholders’ abuse of their powers of control.  In some way, they caused the 
corporation to default on its contract with the plaintiff.  Or perhaps they have 
managed the corporation in a way that resulted in a physical injury to a third 
party that cannot be redressed out of the entity’s assets.  Rather than an 
independent, autonomous “person” acting on its own and pursuing its own 
interests, the corporation is seen to be a mere agent or instrumentality—a 
marionette—of the controlling shareholders, manipulated by them to promote 
their own advantages at others’ expense.  As such, the corporation has “no 
separate mind, will or existence of its own and is but a business conduit for its 
principal.”85  The shareholders therefore ought to be liable for the harm they 
have caused.86 
If the courts in cases like these are serious about a finding of agency, there 
is no need to consider veil piercing at all.  Shareholder liability instead follows 
from standard agency law principles that hold the principal responsible for the 
 
 84 For a thoughtful exploration of the use and abuse of agency law in veil-piercing cases, see Thompson, 
supra note 8. 
 85 Zaist v. Olson, 227 A.2d 552, 557 (Conn. 1967) (quoting WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 205 (1963)). 
 86 See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 8 (N.Y. 1966) (“[W]henever anyone uses control of 
the corporation to further his own rather than the corporation’s business, he will be liable for the corporation’s 
acts ‘upon the principles of respondeat superior applicable even where the agent is a natural person.’”) 
(citation omitted); Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (“Dominion may be so 
complete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general rules of agency the [corporate] parent will be a 
principal and the subsidiary an agent.”) (citation omitted). 
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acts of the agent.87  In fact, however, careful attention to those principles may 
prevent a finding of agency.88  An agency relationship depends not only on 
control (or right of control) by one person over another.  There is also a 
requirement that the controlling person manifest assent that the other party 
shall act on the controlling person’s behalf.89  Evidence bearing on this element 
often will be lacking, especially in cases in which planners have taken great 
care to establish the separate identity of parent-subsidiary corporations and 
scrupulously observed the formalities involved in seemingly independent 
decision-making processes.90  In such cases, use of the agency concept is only 
metaphorical or rhetorical and is relied upon simply to justify a conclusion 
that, for some other reason, liability should follow from shareholder control.91 
The agency cases assume the corporation’s separate existence but 
emphasize shareholder control as the basis for finding liability based on a 
principal-agent relationship.  In contrast, other decisions similarly focus on the 
shareholders’ control or domination of the corporation’s activities but infer 
from those facts that the corporation and its shareholders actually have no 
separate existence or identity.  Where justice seems to require that the 
shareholders be held liable, courts will state that the shareholders’ control of 
the corporation has allowed them to act just as they would if there were no 
incorporation.  The corporation thus is merely their “alter ego” and may be 
referred to as a “sham”92 or a “dummy.”93  The emphasis on shareholder 
control is similar to the agency decisions but a different basis for veil piercing 
is asserted.  That conclusion may be even easier to reach if shareholders have 
failed to observe the formalities (as to issuance of stock, filings, meetings, and 
 
 87 See Robert W. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979, 983–84 (1971). 
 88 See Thompson, supra note 8, at 1328. 
 89 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2005) (“Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises 
when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the 
principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents 
so to act.”). 
 90 See Thompson, supra note 8, at 1331. 
 91 See Zaist v. Olson, 227 A.2d 552, 557 (Conn. 1967) (“[E]ither an implied agency was meant [by the 
court below], or the term ‘agency’ was loosely used, as is sometimes done, to pierce the shield of immunity 
afforded by the corporate structure in a situation in which the corporate entity has been so controlled and 
dominated that justice requires liability to be imposed on the real actor.”) (citation omitted). 
 92 See, e.g., Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 2d 824, 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) 
(“The alter ego doctrine prevents individuals or other corporations from misusing the corporate laws by the 
device of a sham corporate entity formed for the purpose of committing fraud or other misdeeds.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 93 See, e.g., Frazier v. Bryan Mem’l Hosp. Auth., 775 P.2d 281, 288 (Okla. 1989) (Piercing based on alter 
ego theory is appropriate where facts indicate that subsidiary corporation was a “dummy” or “mere 
instrumentality” of the parent.). 
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decision processes) required of those seeking to do business in the corporate 
form.  In these cases, courts may conclude that shareholders who are actually 
acting in their own capacity ought to be held accountable because they, rather 
than some separate corporate entity, are morally responsible for the losses they 
have brought about.  The corporate veil is not so much pierced as its very 
existence is denied or disclaimed. 
While the intuition linking shareholder responsibility to control may be 
valid under certain circumstances, the rhetoric of agency or “alter ego” is 
unfortunate.  The emphasis on the relationship between the shareholders and 
the corporation is misplaced.  Human agency necessarily lies behind all 
corporate action or inaction.  In close corporations, at least some of the 
shareholders are almost always involved in control of the business and they 
naturally will use that control to promote their own interests, just as the 
partners in a general partnership would.  The same is true in the parent-
subsidiary context.  The fact of control means inevitably that the corporation 
will not be truly independent from its shareholders even if scrupulous attention 
is paid to legal formalities establishing separate corporate existence.  The 
search for a corporate “will” or purpose separate from that of its controlling 
shareholders is absurd.  While it might make sense as a matter of abstract logic 
to have shareholder responsibility turn on the extent to which the shareholders 
caused the corporation to act as it did, a focus on shareholder control and the 
ends for which control is exercised invites controversy over facts that will be 
present to some degree in virtually every case involving a closely held 
corporation or corporate subsidiary. 
Perhaps for this reason, most jurisdictions that employ agency or “alter 
ego” standards recognize that courts also need to look further and identify what 
is blameworthy about the defendant’s use of control.  Therefore, a number of 
states mandate both a finding of control and the presence of “injustice” or 
“inequity” to pierce the corporate veil.  A leading case from California typifies 
this approach, requiring proof “(1) that there be such unity of interest and 
ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual 
no longer exist and (2) that, if the acts are treated as those of the corporation 
alone, an inequitable result will follow.”94 
 
 94 Automotriz Del Golfo de Cal. v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1957) (citation omitted).  For similar 
two-part formulations, see, e.g., Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. R.E. Roark Cos., 617 N.E.2d 
1075, 1085 (Ohio 1993) (“[T]he ‘veil’ of the corporation can be ‘pierced’ and individual shareholders held 
liable for corporate misdeeds when it would be unjust to allow the shareholders to hide behind the fiction of 
the corporate entity.  Courts will permit individual shareholder liability only if the shareholder is 
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While a finding of control should be a necessary condition for shareholder 
liability based on veil piercing95 and courts are also correct to look for 
wrongful conduct in addition to control, these formulations are inadequate.  
Without an explanation of what courts mean by injustice or inequity, vague, 
contestable concepts like these provide virtually no guidance to business 
planners and managers about the circumstances under which courts will 
disregard the corporate entity. 
Often, courts will include a reference to “fraud” when stating the injustice 
requirement.96  Unfortunately, this adds little in the way of analytical clarity.  It 
seems that something other than the technical meaning of fraud is often 
implied.97  If the shareholders have defrauded the plaintiff (for example, by 
denying corporate existence or providing phony personal guarantees), that 
itself provides a basis for recovery against them without the need for a veil-
piercing claim.  Instead, fraud is apparently intended in a more general sense to 
mean bad faith or unfairness rather than just deliberate dishonesty designed to 
induce reliance.98  Of course, such usage merely begs the question of what is 
meant by bad faith or unfairness, terms no more precise than injustice or 
inequity. 
 
indistinguishable from or the ‘alter ego’ of the corporation itself.”); State v. Angelo,  800 P.2d 11 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1990) (“The courts may disregard the corporate form in civil cases only when there is unity of interest 
and ownership between an individual and a corporation, and when disregarding that corporate form is 
necessary to prevent injustice or fraud.”); Terre Du Lac Ass’n, Inc. v. Terre Du Lac, Inc., 737 S.W.2d 206, 218 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (“The test for piercing the corporate veil is therefore two-pronged: first, the corporation 
must be controlled and influenced by persons or by another corporation; second, the evidence must establish 
that the corporate cloak was used as a subterfuge to defeat public convenience, to justify a wrong, or to 
perpetuate a fraud.”). 
 95 See infra Part IV.A. 
 96 See, e.g., Kline v. Kline, 305 N.W.2d 297, 298–99 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (“Where the corporation is a 
mere agent or instrumentality of its shareholders or a device to avoid legal obligations, the corporate entity 
may be ignored . . . .  A court may look through the veil of corporate structure to avoid fraud or injustice.”) 
(citations omitted); Employers’ Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Lunt, 313 P.2d 393, 395 (Ariz. 1957) (“The 
corporate fiction will . . . be disregarded upon the concurrence of two circumstances; that is, when the 
corporation is, in fact, the alter ego of one or a few individuals and when the observance of the corporate form 
would sanction a fraud or promote injustice.”) (citation omitted); State v. Angelo, 800 P.2d 11 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1990); Terre Du Lac Ass’n, Inc. v. Terre Du Lac, Inc., 737 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). 
 97 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “fraud” as “[a]n intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of 
inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or to surrender a legal 
right.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 594 (5th ed. 1979). 
 98 Black’s Law Dictionary also informs us that “fraud” can have a more general meaning, being 
synonymous with “bad faith” and also with “dishonesty, infidelity, faithlessness, perfidy, unfairness, etc.”  Id. 
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2. Nonobservance of Corporate Formalities 
Corporation statutes impose a number of requirements on those seeking to 
take advantage of the corporate form.  Issuance of stock for consideration, 
annual shareholders’ meetings, election of directors, appointment of officers by 
the board, major corporate decision making by means of board resolution, 
separate corporate books of account, properly documented loans and 
distributions—all these are legal requirements, regardless of whether there are 
one, a few, or thousands of shareholders.  Obviously there is an element of 
play acting to all this in the case of close corporations, as the same individuals 
typically assume the roles of shareholders, directors, and officers, and the lines 
between personal and corporate assets are often blurry.  Nevertheless, courts 
frequently point to failure to observe corporate formalities as a reason to pierce 
the corporate veil.  Some courts have held that nonobservance by itself is not 
enough to warrant veil piercing.99  Other courts treat it as sufficient if the 
nonobservance is extensive, even if creditors were not misled into believing 
they were dealing with the shareholders individually rather than with a 
corporation.100 
Veil piercing based on failure to observe corporate formalities is 
problematic because the punishment may not fit the crime.  By itself, 
inattentiveness to the annual shareholders meeting charade, failure to maintain 
a board of director’s minute book, or sloppy record keeping should not warrant 
potentially crushing personal liability.  It makes little sense for shareholders to 
forfeit their limited liability for such relatively trivial omissions. 
Even if the inattention to formalities is pervasive, it is questionable whether 
that fact alone should be a sufficient basis for veil piercing.  The question 
ought to be whether the controlling shareholders have somehow used their 
powers of control illegitimately.  The answer to that question turns on the way 
they have managed the business’s finances and the effects of those activities on 
the corporation’s creditors.  Failure to observe statutory requirements does not 
necessarily have anything to do with the harm sustained by the corporation’s 
creditors or, by itself, with the question of shareholder responsibility. 
The matter may be otherwise if shareholders have deliberately ignored 
corporate formalities to mislead creditors into believing they were dealing with 
the shareholders directly rather than with agents of a corporation.  For 
 
 99 See, e.g.., Soloman v. W. Hills Dev. Co., 312 N.W.2d 428, 432 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). 
 100 See, e.g., Victoria Elevator Co. v. Meriden Grain Co., 283 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 1979). 
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example, suppose that the partners in an existing partnership have recently 
converted their business to a corporation.  In dealing with a third party that has 
extended credit to them previously, the shareholders continue to use the 
partnership’s stationery (which of course does not identify the business as 
“Inc.”) and avoid mentioning that they are acting on behalf of the new 
corporation.  Their intention is to limit the creditor’s claim to corporate assets.  
Meanwhile, the creditor believes that it is still dealing with a partnership and 
therefore expects to be able to look to the owners individually to satisfy the 
obligation if the business’s assets are insufficient.  In a case like this, if the 
corporation ends up unable to pay the claim and the shareholders deny 
personal responsibility, the failure to observe corporate formalities will have 
contributed directly to the creditor’s loss and therefore is arguably relevant to 
the question of shareholder liability. 
While nonobservance of corporate formalities may be relevant to 
shareholder liability if it is a significant factor causing a creditor’s loss, there 
may be no need to assert a veil-piercing claim in such cases.  The facts may be 
sufficient to support a garden-variety fraud claim.101  Or, fraudulent 
conveyance doctrine may support liability where shareholders have transferred 
corporate assets to themselves in disregard of statutory requirements to defeat 
creditor claims.102  More creative theories may also obviate a veil-piercing 
claim.  For example, a court might hold the shareholders liable as agents of an 
undisclosed principal.103  In short, nonobservance of corporate formalities 
usually should be irrelevant to the question of shareholder liability.  When it 
does play a role in the creditor’s loss, courts should be able to hold 
shareholders responsible without resorting to veil-piercing analysis. 
3. Undercapitalization 
Undercapitalization or inadequate capital is the third of the most frequently 
mentioned factors in the piercing cases.104  Courts have occasionally stated that 
 
 101 See supra note 97. 
 102 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 43–44 (1986) (applying fraudulent conveyance 
principles to cases in which transfer renders debtor insolvent). 
 103 See Fairbanks v. Chambers, 665 S.W.2d 33, 39–40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).  Note that here the court turns 
the more usual characterization of the corporation as the shareholders’ agent on its head. 
 104 See generally William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 
43 U. PITT. L. REV. 837 (1982) (analyzing piercing cases based on undercapitalization). 
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it is a sufficient basis for veil piercing.105  More often, it is included among the 
laundry list of factors that are potentially relevant.106 
When courts speak of undercapitalization, typically the reference is to the 
amount of capital contributed to the venture when it is launched.107  In this 
vein, a leading commentator has written: 
The attempt to do corporate business without providing any sufficient 
basis of financial responsibilities to creditors . . . will be ineffectual 
to exempt the stockholders from corporate debts . . . .  [S]tockholders 
should in good faith put at the risk of the business unencumbered 
capital reasonably adequate for its prospective liabilities.  If the 
capital is illusory or trifling compared with the business to be done 
and the risks of loss, this is ground for denying the separate entity 
privilege.108 
Although the cases are typically unclear on this point, it seems that 
undercapitalization should be determined according to the amount of equity 
furnished by the shareholders.  Capital contributed in the form of debt is by 
definition already subject to a creditor’s claim and therefore is unavailable to 
satisfy the claims of others who have extended credit to the corporation but 
have not been paid.109 
Influential as this idea might be, taken by itself initial capitalization should 
be of limited relevance to the question of shareholder liability for corporate 
obligations.  Corporation statutes no longer include requirements for minimal 
initial capitalization or ongoing levels of capital.110  Further, emphasis on 
 
 105 See, e.g., Shapoff v. Scull, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1457, 1470 (Ct. App. 1990) (“The requirements of the 
[alter ego] doctrine may be met where . . . the corporation is undercapitalized in light of its prospective 
liabilities.”) (citation omitted); Serv. Iron Foundry, Inc. v. M.A. Bell Co., 588 P.2d 463, 475 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1978); Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Props., Inc., 562 P.2d 244, 247 (Wash. 1977). 
 106 See, e.g., supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 107 See, e.g., J.L. Brock Builders, Inc. v. Dahlbeck, 391 N.W.2d 110, 115 (Neb. 1986) (“Inadequate 
capitalization is measured at the time of formation . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
 108 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 44.1, at 528 
(rev. perm. ed. 1983).  This language is a near quotation of a passage in HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, 
BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 303 (rev. ed. 1946). 
 109 Where equity is meager, courts may recharacterize shareholder loans as equity or subordinate 
shareholder claims to those of outside creditors.  See, e.g., Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958); 
Abraham v. Lake Forest, Inc., 377 So. 2d 465 (La. Ct. App. 1979); In re Mader’s Stores for Men, Inc. v. 
DeDakis, 254 N.W.2d 171 (Wis. 1977). 
 110 For a survey of earlier requirements, see Richard A. Booth, Capital Requirements in United States 
Corporation Law 5–7 (Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2005-64, 2005), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=864685. 
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original contribution of equity capital as a fund for protection of future 
creditors ignores business realities. 
Founders of small businesses often lack the ability to make large capital 
contributions out of their own funds.  Even if they are able to do so, they may 
prefer to make the most of their contribution in the form of debt rather than 
equity to reduce tax liability.111  Debt is also somewhat less risky than equity; 
if the business fails, shareholders may be better off in relation to outside 
creditors if their contributions were in the form of loans rather than payment 
for stock.  If the shareholders seek to raise capital from third parties, here, too, 
they will prefer that those contributions take the form of debt because debt 
financing allows the business’s founders to take advantage of the benefits of 
leverage; they claim all earnings net of debt service and other expenses, 
without having to share those gains with other equity investors.  In short, 
practical considerations will often lead responsible business owners to prefer 
debt financing over equity.  A rule of law that imposes personal liability on 
shareholders because of relatively modest initial equity financing makes no 
sense. 
Further, even a large amount of equity capital contributed to the 
corporation at the time of formation offers no protection to future creditors if it 
is subsequently distributed to the shareholders or used to meet payroll or other 
operating expenses.  Similarly, funds invested in firm-specific assets of limited 
liquidation value also will not be available to satisfy creditor’s claims.  On the 
other hand, a relatively modest initial equity contribution may not lead to any 
problems if the business is able to discharge its obligations out of operating 
revenues.  There is, in other words, no clear connection between the amount of 
the shareholders’ initial equity contribution and the corporation’s ability to pay 
its debts in a timely manner.112 
If the point of the court’s reliance on the undercapitalization idea is that the 
shareholders are expected not only to contribute initially but also to maintain at 
 
 111 Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code allows corporations to deduct interest payments but not 
dividend distributions.  Corporations eligible to be taxed under Subchapter S generally avoid tax liability, and 
so this consideration does not apply. 
 112 Courts often mention “siphoning” of corporate funds as a basis for piercing.  While distributions to 
shareholders clearly can threaten legitimate creditor interests, piercing seems an unnecessary tool to police that 
concern.  Corporation law statutes already restrict the ability of shareholders to render a firm insolvent through 
dividend distributions.  See, e.g., REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40(c) (1985).  Fraudulent conveyance 
principles and bankruptcy law’s rules about preferences regulate in this manner as well.  The doctrine of 
equitable subordination may also be relevant.  There is no reason for courts to emphasize this factor as a 
reason for veil piercing. 
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all times a particular net worth in the corporation for the benefit of corporate 
creditors, such a requirement would not differ fundamentally from a rule of 
unlimited liability.113  Either way, the shareholders would function as personal 
guarantors of corporate obligations.  The cost of such a requirement to the 
shareholders could be prohibitively high, and the benefit of limited liability as 
a risk reallocation device would be lost.  The threat of veil piercing should not 
amount to a requirement that all corporations maintain a shareholder-financed 
insurance fund.  As explained below, shareholders can act responsibly toward 
corporate creditors in other ways.114 
III.  LIMITING LIMITED LIABILITY 
Despite its current incoherence, veil piercing can play an important role in 
ensuring that corporate shareholders do not use limited liability in ways that 
are inconsistent with sound public policy.  We have seen that the rationale for 
limited liability is subsidization of business investment at the expense of 
contract and tort creditors.115  The limited liability default rule benefits 
shareholders by shifting the costs of accidents and other harms from 
themselves over to the victims of business activity.  Shareholders may also 
benefit in relation to contract claimants by paying less for limited liability than 
they would if the default were unlimited liability.  Nevertheless, under some 
circumstances shareholders can use limited liability to facilitate behavior that 
imposes excessive and unjustifiable costs on creditors that corporate law 
should not sanction.  If it is based on an intelligent understanding of the 
appropriate limits of limited liability, veil piercing can provide an effective 
device for policing these kinds of shareholder misconduct. 
Courts that have employed veil piercing to hold shareholders liable for 
corporate obligations recognize that the limited liability shield can be 
overbroad and therefore should not be respected in all cases.  While the legal 
standard is very vague,116 the piercing cases reflect a moral intuition that 
shareholders who abuse limited liability to extract wealth from third parties 
should be held responsible under certain circumstances.  The problem is that 
the doctrine in this area has developed without thoughtful attention to just what 
kinds of misbehavior justify disregard of the corporate entity.  Instead, the 
 
 113 Hackney & Benson, supra note 104, at 898. 
 114 See infra Part IV.B.1, C.1. 
 115 See supra Part I.C. 
 116 See supra Part II.B. 
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various factors discussed above—all of problematic relevance—are simply 
trotted out in seemingly random ways to justify what appears to be little more 
than an instinctive sense that the shareholders deserve to be held accountable. 
The reason for the doctrinal confusion and unpredictability of results in the 
veil-piercing cases is the courts’ persistent failure to articulate and then base 
their analysis on a sound understanding of the policy basis for limited liability.  
Only with a coherent view of the appropriate reasons for limited liability can 
courts hope to think rationally about the limits that ought to be imposed on its 
scope. 
In this Part, I seek to identify some ideas that might better serve courts 
striving to make sense of those limits.  Part IV will then present a proposal for 
law reform in more concrete detail.  This Part begins with consideration of the 
reasons why corporations default on their obligations to creditors.  It identifies 
two general categories.  One, which I term “ordinary business failure,” does 
not involve illegitimate behavior by shareholders and therefore presents an 
appropriate circumstance for limited liability protection.  Courts should not 
pierce the corporate veil in these cases.  The other category, however, includes 
various kinds of opportunistic behavior by shareholders who hide behind the 
limited liability shield to deliberately or recklessly extract value from third 
parties without compensation.  In my view, corporate law should not facilitate 
this kind of behavior.  Part III.C develops the arguments against allowing 
limited liability to protect shareholders from creditor claims resulting from 
opportunistic conduct.  Abolition of veil piercing and reliance solely on 
liability for individual misconduct would not adequately prevent inappropriate 
uses of the limited liability shield. 
A. Reasons for Corporate Default 
Corporations may find themselves unable to pay their bills or satisfy tort 
claims for a number of reasons.  To grasp the appropriate policy justification 
for limited liability, we can divide these reasons into two general categories.  
The first I term “ordinary business failure,” using the term “ordinary” to 
express the notion that sometimes businesses fail for reasons that have nothing 
to do with the fault of their owners.  In fact, the rate of failure for all small 
businesses is quite high.  Many of these are cases of ordinary business failure.  
In contrast are those cases in which corporate insolvency results from the 
shareholders’ selfishly motivated deliberate or reckless disregard for creditor 
claims. 
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1. Ordinary Business Failure 
Sometimes a corporation ends up being unable to pay contract creditors 
because of developments that were unforeseen at the time the obligations were 
incurred.  For example, production costs can increase beyond the amount of 
the shareholders’ reasonable expectations.  This can be the result of changes in 
the market for a key input, such as a natural resource.  New government 
regulations can also raise costs unexpectedly.  Or, demand for the company’s 
product can decline due to any number of unpredictable reasons.  Perhaps a 
competitor has developed a better product or found a way to produce more 
cheaply, or maybe technological innovation has rendered an entire product line 
obsolete.  Reduced demand resulting from reasons like these will mean 
revenues lower than the shareholders reasonably expected. 
If cash flow is inadequate, the business may need to resort to assets on hand 
to pay its creditors in a timely manner.  However, even a business with 
significant net worth may be unable to do so if liquid assets—cash or other 
assets readily convertible to cash—are insufficient.  Capital assets may have 
limited liquidation value, especially if they are firm specific.  Uninsured 
casualty losses may also deplete a business’s asset value after it has incurred an 
obligation to a third party.  If assets and revenues are unavailable, insolvency is 
inevitable unless the business can find new sources of cash.  Short-term 
borrowing may be one solution,117 but if the revenue shortfall is due to lasting 
causes, reliance on more debt will only postpone the inevitable. 
A tort judgment resulting in a huge claim against the corporation can also 
lead to insolvency.  The basis for the claim may be an accident that has 
resulted in a loss much larger than could reasonably have been anticipated.  In 
that case, the corporation’s liability insurance policy may be insufficient to 
satisfy a judgment in favor of the victim. 
These scenarios share a common feature.  The immediate cause of the 
corporation’s inability to satisfy a claim brought by a contract or tort creditor is 
not the result of events or circumstances brought about by the owners 
themselves.  A certain amount of risk is involved in any business venture and 
can never be eliminated entirely.  Insolvency resulting from events that 
reasonable shareholders could not anticipate or the occurrence of which was 
 
 117 See, e.g., PHILIP J. ADELMAN & ALAN M. MARKS, ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE: FINANCE FOR SMALL 
BUSINESS 162–63 (1998) (discussing the establishment of a line of credit to protect against cash flow 
deficiencies). 
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reasonably deemed to be a remote possibility are what I have in mind when I 
refer to “ordinary business failure.”  In these cases, there is no meaningful 
sense in which shareholders were at fault in causing the creditor’s loss. 
2. Deliberate or Reckless Disregard for Creditors’ Claims 
Contrast insolvency due to ordinary business failure with a corporation’s 
inability to satisfy a creditor’s claim due to the shareholders’ management of 
the corporation with deliberate or reckless disregard for creditor interests.  
Shareholders can use their control over a corporation to act opportunistically 
toward corporate creditors.  Opportunism in the contract setting implies 
deliberate efforts by one party to benefit itself by defeating the bargained-for 
expectations of the other party.118  Various tactics are possible.  In each case, 
the corporation’s inability to meet its obligations results from the efforts of 
shareholders deliberately or recklessly imposing losses on creditors that the 
creditors did not voluntarily accept. 
Those who extend credit to a corporation are in a different position than 
they would be if they were dealing with a sole proprietor or a business whose 
owners did not enjoy limited liability.  This is so because limited liability 
creates occasions for shareholder opportunism that otherwise would not exist.  
Owners of a business have the same incentive to maximize profits regardless 
of whether the firm is organized as a limited liability entity.  However, 
potential creditors of a corporation (or another limited liability entity), who can 
look only to the entity’s assets for satisfaction of their claims, are vulnerable to 
the risk that shareholders will use their control over a business having separate 
entity status to shift costs to creditors that they have not agreed to bear.  
Shareholders can do this by causing the corporation to take actions that benefit 
the shareholders while reducing the corporation’s ability to meet its 
obligations.  Such possibilities do not exist in the absence of limited liability 
because, if creditors transact directly with the owners of a business rather than 
with an entity having a legal status separate from that of the owners, they can 
hold the owners directly accountable for their conduct. 
Shareholder opportunism toward third parties can take a number of forms.  
The common feature in each of these scenarios is the shareholders’ ability and 
incentive to use the corporation to extract value from third parties by means of 
actions that the shareholders could not get away with if liability were 
 
 118 See POSNER, supra note 43, at 93–98 (explaining that the purpose of contract law is to deter 
opportunistic behavior). 
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unlimited.  In that case, shareholders would have to internalize the costs of 
business decisions and activities that third parties have not agreed to bear. 
a. Ex Ante Opportunism 
As to contract creditors, those in control of a corporation may know at the 
time an obligation is incurred that the corporation will be unable to pay the 
claim.  Inability need not be the result of shareholders’ intention to loot the 
corporation of its assets to enrich themselves.  Perhaps the proceeds of a loan 
will be used to discharge an existing third-party liability under circumstances 
in which revenue will be insufficient to repay the lender.  Or perhaps the 
business is already losing money but the owners have borrowed to meet 
operating expenses despite the absence of any reasonable likelihood that the 
business’s decline can be reversed and the debt ultimately discharged. 
In cases like these, shareholders cause their corporation to incur 
indebtedness with knowledge that there is no reasonable likelihood of 
repayment.  Had they faced liability in their own right, the shareholders surely 
would have been reluctant to do this.  However, because the creditor’s claims 
are limited to corporate assets, shareholders have an incentive to borrow even 
in these situations. 
Even if there is no actual knowledge of the corporation’s inability to fulfill 
an obligation, the shareholders can cause the corporation to incur a debt 
without thinking seriously about whether it will be possible to pay interest and 
principal when due.  A business’s owners can buy on credit from a supplier 
without having paid sufficient attention to the corporation’s expected cash 
flows and current working capital condition.  Whether the result of deliberate 
planning or of reckless disregard for the business’s condition and prospects, 
corporate status may enable the firm’s owners to impose these losses on 
creditors while relying on the limited liability shield to protect their personal 
wealth. 
Shareholders can also act opportunistically by committing the business to 
high-risk projects that bear a relatively small possibility of rich return.  For 
example, a firm might seek to develop a new product by using borrowed 
money to fund a new research team.  There is a small probability that the 
investment will eventually generate revenues significantly greater than its cost.  
There is a significantly larger probability, however, that the project will 
generate insufficient revenues to pay back the funds borrowed to finance it.  If 
the shareholders were personally liable for the corporation’s debt, they would 
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not undertake the project because its expected return is less than its cost.  
However, with limited liability, they may be willing to cause the corporation to 
undertake such a project as long as the expected return is greater than the 
amount of money they have already invested in the business.  If the project 
turns out to be successful, the shareholders reap the rewards.  If it fails to 
generate significant added value, however, limited liability will restrict the 
lender’s claim to corporate assets, even if they are insufficient.  Limited 
liability thus can create an incentive to engage in projects whose costs exceed 
their expected value.119 
Such decisions are problematic because the shareholders have caused the 
corporation to incur an obligation that they know bears a significant likelihood 
of nonpayment.  If they know or should know that this is so and have actively 
concealed the extent of the risk from the lender, the shareholders have acted 
opportunistically.  Even if there has been no active misrepresentation, the 
lender can claim to be the victim of opportunism if the shareholders knew that 
the borrowed funds were to be used for a project whose cost exceeded its 
expected return. 
As long as the firm’s owners can conceal from creditors their bad faith 
intentions or their reckless disregard for the corporation’s ability to meet its 
future obligations, shareholders may be able to obtain credit from lenders who 
do not appreciate the full magnitude of the risk they have undertaken.  
Potential lenders may lack knowledge that could lead them to refuse to deal or, 
should they choose to assume the risk, to demand compensation in the form of 
an appropriately adjusted interest rate or a security interest.  Creditors thus 
must take the initiative to investigate the creditworthiness of corporate debtors 
and bear the risk of their own ignorance.  Unlimited liability would also 
require creditor investigation of shareholder wealth, but that rule would not 
allow business owners to assign specified assets in the firm while protecting 
 
 119 Assume the following facts by way of a simple illustration.  The cost of the project to the corporation 
is $100,000, to be financed by borrowing.  There is a 20% probability that the project will return $300,000 and 
an 80% likelihood that the return will only be $20,000.  The shareholders have previously invested $10,000 of 
their own funds in the business.  Even though the expected return on this project is only $76,000 ((.20 x 
$300,000) + (.80 x $20,000)), which is less than its cost, the shareholders may still decide to go ahead because 
they stand to lose only the $10,000 they had previously contributed to the firm if the return is insufficient to 
repay the debt.  If, however, liability were unlimited, they would be responsible for the balance due after the 
business’s resources were exhausted and therefore would be required to repay the full $100,000.  Since the 
expected return is only $76,000, the investment would not be rational.  For a discussion of the concept of 
expected return, see KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 31, at 229–30. 
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the remainder from creditors of the business.120  By restricting creditor access 
to shareholder wealth, limited liability increases the cost of failure to obtain 
full information about the risk of insolvency. 
b. Ex Post Opportunism 
Even if the shareholders have obligated the corporation to a third party in 
good faith and they have done so after reasonable analysis of the business’s 
ability to pay the claim, the shareholders may thereafter take actions that 
increase the risk of default beyond what it was at the time the obligation was 
incurred.  Here, too, limited liability can facilitate shareholder opportunism 
toward contract creditors. 
Controlling shareholders can use their powers of control to “siphon” assets 
out of the corporation in the form of cash or noncash dividends.  The result is 
that payment of creditor claims is thereafter more heavily dependent on the 
business’s cash flows, and so the risk of default increases.  Similarly, loans to 
shareholders can likewise jeopardize the firm’s liquidity and thereby increase 
the risk of default.  Unlimited liability would allow recovery from the 
shareholders individually in either case, but limited liability interferes with that 
result.121 
Shareholders also act opportunistically toward the firm’s existing creditors 
when they commit the corporation to a project with expected return less than 
its cost.  In such cases, as discussed above, the shareholders have incurred a 
significant risk that the corporation will be unable to repay the debt.  If that 
happens, the lender will look to the corporation’s assets for payment.  By 
putting these assets at greater risk, the shareholders have reduced the 
likelihood that the business’s existing creditors will be paid.122  Such projects 
thus devalue the rights of existing creditors, who now find themselves holding 
claims that are worth less than they bargained for and therefore bear too low an 
interest rate.  Here, limited liability allows the business’s owners to chase the 
 
 120 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 
387 (2000) (discussing the role of law in facilitating the division of assets between owners’ personal assets and 
those of the firm). 
 121 Fraudulent conveyance doctrine may provide a basis for shareholder liability if the transfers were 
made without consideration and result in unreasonably small capital.  See CLARK, supra note 102, at 43–44. 
 122 Decisions that increase the risk of insolvency harm all existing creditors.  Their vulnerability is 
compounded if the shareholders cause the corporation to incur additional indebtedness that is senior to existing 
claims or is secured by a pledge or mortgage of assets that otherwise would be available to apply toward 
satisfaction of those claims. 
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low-probability prospect of high returns at the expense of the corporation’s 
creditors by pursuing a course of action that would not be rational if the 
shareholders were personally liable to the firm’s creditors. 
c. Tort Creditors 
Limited liability also encourages opportunistic behavior toward third 
parties who have not voluntarily extended credit to the corporation.  Because 
the shareholders do not bear personal responsibility for harm that the 
corporation causes, limited liability encourages shareholders to use the firm to 
engage in profitable activities that are potentially harmful to third parties.  This 
is so even if the social costs of such behavior are greater than its potential 
benefits to the shareholders.  As in the contract context, the expected value of a 
project need only exceed the amount of capital that the shareholders have 
invested in the business and thus stand to lose if a large judgment is entered 
against the corporation.  There is no incentive to minimize accident costs by 
taking cost-effective precautions or declining to engage in extremely hazardous 
activities.  In contrast, if liability were unlimited, shareholders would be 
reluctant to assume the risk of large tort judgments that exceed an activity’s 
expected value.  Limited liability thus creates a moral hazard problem that 
otherwise would not exist.123 
In the scenarios involving contract creditors, shareholders act 
opportunistically by imposing on claimants risks that they have not agreed to 
accept and for which they therefore have not received compensation.  
Opportunism in the tort setting involves a different problem.  In that context, 
there is no bargaining in advance between the corporation and the tort victim, 
and so there is no question of voluntary acceptance and agreed compensation 
ex ante.  However, if the tortfeasor fully compensates the victim for his or her 
loss, the victim is no worse off even though the transaction that gave rise to the 
creditor’s claim was nonconsensual. 
Limited liability reduces the likelihood that the victim will receive full 
compensation because the claim is limited to the corporation’s assets.  Absent 
limited liability, the shareholders would face the prospect of personal liability 
in the event of the corporation’s inability to pay the claim in full.  Shareholders 
act opportunistically by causing the corporation to engage in activities that 
have the potential to harm third parties, without providing for compensation 
out of the corporation’s assets or the proceeds of an insurance policy.  In other 
 
 123 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16, at 49–50; Mendelson, supra note 35, at 1233–35. 
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words, opportunism in the tort context consists of deliberate or reckless 
externalization of some of the costs of business activity.  In contrast, if a third 
party’s injury results in a loss that is greater than could reasonably have been 
anticipated, the shareholders have not acted opportunistically if they have 
failed to make advance provision for compensation. 
The common feature in both the contract and tort scenarios is the 
shareholders’ ability and incentive to use the corporation to transact with third 
parties in ways that the shareholders themselves would be unwilling to do if 
liability were unlimited.  If they could be held personally accountable to tort or 
contract creditors of their business, shareholders would be reluctant to act 
opportunistically.  Third party losses would still occur, but they would be the 
result of circumstances that the shareholders had no reason to anticipate and 
for which they therefore cannot be expected to have provided. 
B. The Appropriate Scope of Limited Liability 
1. The Policy Choice 
As discussed above, limited liability is designed to function as a risk 
allocation device.124  It shifts the risk of business insolvency from the 
business’s owners to its creditors and therefore imposes on them the burden to 
take whatever protective measures they deem to be appropriate.  In this 
respect, limited liability can be thought of as a subsidy paid by those who 
transact with corporations. The purpose of the subsidy is to encourage 
entrepreneurial activity and investment. 
The policy question is, how large should this subsidy be?  Should 
shareholders enjoy exemption from personal liability for corporate obligations 
in all circumstances?  Or, instead, should limited liability be limited, that is, 
tailored so as to be unavailable if certain conditions are present?  These 
questions are important because the answers in effect determine the magnitude 
of the risk reallocation and the extent to which third parties can be required to 
bear the costs of business activity.  In particular, the policy question calls for a 
judgment about the extent to which shareholders will be allowed to act 
opportunistically and thus deliberately or recklessly impose losses on unwilling 
third parties. 
 
 124 See supra Part I.C. 
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If limited liability is to exist at all, it surely is appropriate as a device for 
protection of shareholders from the costs of ordinary business failure.  By 
definition, in these cases shareholders have attempted in good faith to operate 
their business with due regard for creditor interests.  While seeking to 
maximize return on their investments of financial and human capital, the 
shareholders have also accepted credit on the reasonable assumption that the 
business will be able to pay these claims when they come due.  Similarly, they 
have provided for harm to third parties resulting from business activities either 
by self-insuring or by purchasing liability insurance.  When it turns out that the 
business cannot pay a claim despite having acted in this manner, this seems to 
be the kind of paradigmatic loss that limited liability ought to cover.  Even 
owners acting entirely in good faith must fear the possibility of corporate 
insolvency due to causes over which they have no control.  Limited liability 
protects them from personal financial disaster and therefore is an appropriate 
device for encouragement of entrepreneurial risk taking that otherwise would 
not occur. 
It is not at all clear that shareholders who behave opportunistically should 
also enjoy the limited liability shield.  In these cases, business owners are 
either imposing risks on contract creditors who have not agreed to accept those 
risks or are deliberately or recklessly subjecting members of the public to 
possible injuries that the corporation cannot compensate.  Public policy could 
endorse protection of shareholders from business failure due to unavoidable 
events or circumstances without going so far as to extend the limited liability 
shield to losses resulting from opportunism.  Defining the scope of limited 
liability so broadly as to encompass the latter as well as the former would 
encourage behavior that arguably ought not to be encouraged.  The next 
section elaborates on the case against a broad conception of limited liability.  I 
then suggest, in Part IV, how veil piercing can be deployed effectively to tailor 
the scope of limited liability in accordance with sound public policy. 
2. Limiting the Scope of Limited Liability 
a. Fairness and Efficiency Considerations 
The essence of shareholder opportunism as I have defined the concept here 
is the use of limited liability to impose costs on third parties without 
compensation.  Shareholders subject contract creditors to a risk of default that 
is greater than what they think they are agreeing to or have already consented 
to accept.  Both as to contract and tort claimants, shareholders are attempting 
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to extract value from others without paying for it.  Ordinarily, of course, the 
law does not permit, let alone encourage, this sort of behavior and uses terms 
like fraud or larceny to describe it.  Still, one could argue for the lawfulness of 
such behavior in the corporate law context on the ground that allowance 
encourages business investment.  Incorporation would provide business owners 
with the prospect of higher returns than would otherwise be available because 
these kinds of gains would not be possible—or at least would be harder to 
achieve—if ordinary notions of fair play and efficiency applied. 
This defense of limited liability goes too far.  Other than by means of the 
tax system, uncompensated wealth transfers are at least presumptively 
objectionable.  A basic moral intuition demands that people enjoy security of 
person and property.  They should not be deprived of their wealth without 
consent.  If there is no ex ante consent to a welfare-reducing transaction, full 
compensation ought to be forthcoming as a matter of fundamental fairness.  
Efficiency considerations are also relevant.  Legal rules that make it possible 
for some people to extract value from others without compensation are 
inefficient because they encourage expenditure of resources to achieve security 
and may even result in abandonment of productive activities.125 
Refusing to extend limited liability to include protection from claims based 
on opportunism would not eliminate limited liability’s efficacy as a subsidy 
designed to encourage investment in business activity.  Immunity from 
personal liability where corporate insolvency could not reasonably have been 
anticipated would still represent a significant benefit.  The presumption against 
uncompensated wealth transfers therefore should apply to the definition of the 
appropriate scope of limited liability. 
b. Opportunism and the Cost of Credit 
Including within limited liability’s protective mantle shareholders who 
have behaved opportunistically toward existing and potential creditors is also 
bad policy because it unnecessarily increases the cost of credit to all 
corporations and their investors.  This is so because creditors must factor the 
risk of opportunism into all of their credit pricing decisions, even though not 
all borrowers will in fact behave opportunistically. 
Contract creditors confronted with the risk of corporate insolvency demand 
compensation ex ante for taking on the added risk posed by shareholder limited 
 
 125 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 43, at 36. 
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liability.  The higher interest rate paid by the corporation reduces the 
shareholders’ return on their investment.  The size of the interest rate 
differential depends on creditor’s assessments of the risk of corporate 
insolvency in particular situations. 
If limited liability is not tailored so as to exclude losses resulting from 
shareholder opportunism, it will protect shareholders whose corporations 
default because of their own opportunism as well as those whose corporations 
are unable to pay their debts despite the shareholders’ good faith efforts to 
manage the business responsibly.  In the language of game theory, we can posit 
two classes of shareholders: a “good” type and a “bad” type.126  One group is 
prone toward good faith, honorable business behavior, while the other seeks to 
make money by extracting value from others without compensation.127 
Ideally, creditors should adjust their interest rates according to which type 
of borrower they are dealing with.  Corporations managed by good 
shareholders should pay less for credit than corporations managed by bad ones 
because the risk of default is lower in the first scenario than in the second.  The 
problem is that, ex ante, it may be impossible for the lender to tell whether 
those in control of a corporate borrower are likely to engage in behavior 
designed to benefit themselves at the creditor’s expense or whether, instead, 
the shareholders are motivated by a good faith intention to honor the 
corporation’s obligations.  If lenders cannot distinguish good from bad 
borrowers, they will need to insist on an interest rate that reflects the aggregate 
risk presented by the overall pool of good and bad borrowers.  Good borrowers 
therefore end up paying more for credit than they would if the interest rate 
were tailored to them; bad borrowers pay less.128 
Reputational data can assist the lender in assessing the shareholders’ type.  
Credit reports may be instructive and relatively inexpensive to access.  Court 
records or the experiences of other lenders may also be helpful, but that 
information will be more costly to obtain.  If the corporation is new, however, 
it and its shareholders may have no credit history.  Alternatively, shareholders 
who have a clean track record may be tempted to act opportunistically if they 
are unconcerned about the reputational effects of their behavior.  Perhaps they 
have decided to wrap up their business and retire.  In short, lenders may be 
reluctant to rely on reputational data even if it is available. 
 
 126 See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 126 (1994). 
 127 Id. (modeling nonverifiable information as binary). 
 128 See infra notes 133–37 and accompanying text. 
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Good shareholders have an incentive to signal their type to prospective 
lenders.  For good types to be able effectively to use signaling to distinguish 
themselves from bad types, they need to identify actions that they can deploy 
at lower cost to themselves than to the bad types.129  Some signals, like 
membership in the local chamber of commerce or a fancy office suite, will not 
be effective for this reason. 
Good shareholders might offer personal guarantees of corporate obligations 
more cheaply than bad shareholders could do, because by definition they are 
less likely to cause their corporations to default.  In this way, they could signal 
their type and, even though they would expose themselves to personal liability, 
they would presumably benefit from the lower interest rate payable by good 
borrowers.  However, this signal, while potentially effective, could come at too 
great a cost.  It would entail forfeiture of limited liability not only for 
opportunistic default but also for insolvency due to ordinary business failure.  
Even good shareholders may prefer to pay for limited liability to protect 
themselves from unavoidable misfortune. 
If credible signaling strategies are unavailable in this context, are devices 
available by which lenders can screen good borrowers from bad ones to price 
extensions of credit accordingly?  One possible screening mechanism, which, 
as explained below, turns out not to work, could be for lenders to insist on 
personal guarantees from shareholders.  A lender seeking a personal guarantee 
receives a benefit it would otherwise not enjoy and therefore must pay for it, 
presumably in the form of a lower interest rate.  Borrowers intending to act in 
good faith toward corporate creditors face a lower risk of corporate insolvency 
than do shareholders who plan to use control over the corporation to benefit 
themselves at the expense of the business’s creditors.  Personal guarantees 
therefore would be less costly to the first group, who therefore should be 
willing to accept less compensation (such as a smaller interest rate reduction) 
than the bad borrowers would.  In fact, bad borrowers may be unwilling to 
agree to a personal guarantee at all.  Requiring a personal guarantee therefore 
could be an effective screening device.  If so, lenders would be able to identify 
 
 129 More specifically, the cost differential needs to be greater than the amount by which the bad type can 
benefit from investment in the signaling strategy.  See generally John G. Riley, Silver Signals: Twenty-Five 
Years of Screening and Signaling, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 432 (2001) (surveying economic research on screening and 
signaling). 
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good borrowers, who would not have to pay a premium for credit resulting 
from lenders’ inability to distinguish good from bad.130 
In fact, it is not clear that requiring personal guarantees can effectively 
perform a screening function.  Most importantly, self-identification by bad 
borrowers could result in lenders’ refusing to extend credit to them.131  Lenders 
facing the prospect of default by corporate borrowers may not consider the 
right to pursue shareholders’ personal wealth to be sufficient protection.  At the 
very least, they would need to obtain assurances of shareholders’ financial 
ability to guarantee the corporation’s obligation.  If the shareholders have 
already identified themselves as untrustworthy, any such assurances will lack 
credibility.  Further, the need to take legal action to enforce personal 
guarantees can significantly reduce their value to creditors.  If self-
identification by bad borrowers (by demanding more compensation than good 
borrowers for personal guarantees or perhaps refusing to provide such 
guarantees at all) threatens to result in refusal to lend, bad borrowers may not 
be able to afford to self-identify.  In that event, lenders’ insistence on 
shareholder guarantees would not serve a screening function.  All loans would 
be made on the same terms, and, as explained below,132 the existence of bad 
borrowers would result in good borrowers paying more for credit than would 
otherwise be necessary. 
Requiring personal guarantees also may not work as a screening device 
because they do not offer attractive benefits to all creditors.  Reliance on 
personal guarantees is costly, potentially requiring investigation of the 
guarantors’ personal wealth, ongoing monitoring of their liquidity, and 
litigation costs if enforcement is necessary.  For many creditors, the value is 
not worth the cost.  Unsecured creditors therefore seek protection from risk by 
charging a high interest rate across the board.  Other creditors, such as 
mortgage lenders or suppliers of inventory, typically prefer to take a security 
 
 130 It is also conceivable that lenders can screen good from bad borrowers by reference to the latter 
group’s willingness to pay a relatively higher rate of interest.  Willingness to engage in opportunism may 
allow bad borrowers to earn a higher return, who therefore should be willing to pay more for the funds in 
question.  See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 
AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981).  However, if bad borrowers were to identify themselves in this way, lenders may 
refuse to lend, fearing that they will not be repaid.  Bad borrowers might therefore be better off offering to pay 
the same interest rate as the good borrowers. 
 131 For a model explaining why some potential borrowers receive credit while others do not, even though 
they might be willing to pay a higher interest rate or put up more collateral than borrowers who receive loans 
(“credit rationing”), see id.  One of the authors’ key insights is the negative effect of a higher interest rate on 
the risk of default and therefore on the lender’s expected return.  Id. at 401–02. 
 132 See infra notes 133–37 and accompanying text. 
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interest in particular property.  If shareholder guarantees are suitable only for 
certain classes of creditors, they do not present a general solution to the 
informational obstacle faced by those who extend credit to corporations. 
The screening strategy could fail for yet another reason.  Some good 
borrowers may be exceptionally risk averse and therefore extremely reluctant 
to expose their personal wealth to the risk of corporate insolvency.  In such 
cases, it may be impossible for lender and shareholders to reach agreement on 
the amount of the interest rate reduction to be accepted in return for personal 
guarantees.  The shareholders’ refusal to agree to a guarantee would not 
indicate bad faith, but it could be misinterpreted by potential lenders. 
If signaling and screening mechanisms are ineffective, lenders cannot tell 
which type of borrower they are dealing with and therefore cannot price 
discriminate according to type.  That is, they cannot demand a higher interest 
rate from bad borrowers to compensate for the additional risk that they will not 
be repaid.  Lenders must therefore price their extensions of credit on the 
assumption that they may be dealing with a bad type.  Common knowledge 
informs them that not all borrowers are bad, however, and so ideally 
calculation of the appropriate interest rate would require information about the 
percentages of good and bad types among all borrowers.  It would then be 
possible to compute an average of the interest rates appropriate to each of the 
two types, weighted according to their incidence in the total population.133  
Because such data do not exist,134 the amount of the appropriate interest rate 
differential can only be estimated according to lenders’ assumptions about the 
world.  Even so, the point is that all borrowers end up paying this interest 
rate.135 
Accordingly, if limited liability protects opportunistic debtors as well as 
those who act in good faith, good borrowers pay more for credit than they 
would pay if pricing decisions were based on actual risk of default.  
Meanwhile, bad borrowers may end up paying a lower rate than they would 
 
 133 More specifically, a creditor would want to know about the incidence of the full range of borrower 
behavior because the world does not divide neatly into two discrete categories of “good” borrowers and “bad” 
ones. 
 134 Merely knowing the default rate among a class of borrowers is not sufficiently informative because 
default can result from a range of causes—some culpable, some unavoidable—despite a borrower’s best 
efforts. 
 135 In game theory parlance, this is known as a “pooling equilibrium.”  See, e.g., BAIRD ET AL., supra note 
126, at 130.  If lenders were able to distinguish the good borrowers from the bad, the result could be two 
different interest rates (assuming only two categories of borrowers).  This is referred to as a “separating 
equilibrium.”  Id. 
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pay if their type were identifiable.  Broad, untailored limited liability therefore 
does more than just subsidize business owners at the expense of contract 
creditors.  Good borrowers actually end up subsidizing bad ones.136 
By limiting the scope of limited liability, the law could address the 
informational problem that potential creditors confront and thereby reduce the 
cost of credit for good borrowers.  If limited liability were tailored so as to 
deny protection in cases of corporate default due to shareholder opportunism, 
creditors would in effect enjoy personal guarantees from bad shareholders 
without having to bargain for them ex ante.  Creditors therefore could charge 
less for credit, confident in the knowledge that courts will impose liability on 
shareholders where the corporation’s default results from shareholder 
opportunism rather than business failure due to legitimate risk taking.  In other 
words, they could price extensions of credit as if all debtors were good because 
they would not need to protect themselves ex ante from the risk of shareholder 
opportunism by charging everyone an interest rate reflecting the incidence of 
both good and bad types in the full set of borrowers.  If lenders cannot sort bad 
borrowers from good ex ante, veil piercing would authorize courts to perform 
that function ex post. 
For these reasons, the limited liability shield ought to be tailored so as to 
deny protection to corporate borrowers that default on their obligations 
because of shareholder opportunism.  Tailored limited liability would give 
creditors the assurance that they could recover their losses from shareholders 
when corporate insolvency was due to their deliberate or reckless abuse of 
their control powers.  In contrast, those shareholders who did not behave 
improperly would be protected from personal liability unless they had agreed 
ex ante to waive protection in return for appropriate compensation.  The result 
should be a reduction of corporate borrowing costs and a corresponding 
increase in shareholder returns.137  That in turn would increase the incentive to 
 
 136 It is an interesting question whether the overall cost of credit is higher than it would be if a separating 
equilibrium were attainable.  Theoretically, it should not be.  To see this, assume that half of all borrowers are 
of the “good” type; for them the appropriate interest rate is 10%.  For the remaining “bad” borrowers, assume 
that the appropriate interest is 14%.  If a separating equilibrium is not possible, the interest rate should be 12%.  
The total amount of interest paid (number of borrowers times interest) should be the same whether the 
equilibrium is mixed or separating.  In fact, creditors lack the data necessary to perform these calculations.  
Operating more or less in the dark, they will try to obtain as much protection as possible.  There is therefore a 
chance that the mixed equilibrium will end up being higher than it needs to be, say, 12.5 or 13%.  In other 
words, all borrowers would end up paying a premium for the lenders’ ignorance. 
 137 Current veil-piercing law presumably does not have these effects because it is conceptually and 
doctrinally incoherent and therefore unpredictable in application. 
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use the corporate form to pursue entrepreneurial projects, which is the 
underlying policy basis of limited liability in the first place. 
c. Tort Creditors 
Overbroad limited liability presents a different set of issues with respect to 
tort creditors.  Corporate law contemplates that investors doing business as 
corporations will be able to externalize some of the costs of doing business.  
Once they have exhausted the resources of a thinly capitalized corporation, 
judgment creditors have no further recourse against the shareholders’ personal 
wealth, however large the outstanding claim might be.  The limited liability 
shield therefore allows shareholders to engage in potentially profitable 
activities without regard for externalities.  As discussed above,138 the purpose 
is to encourage business investment—including investment in activities that 
have the potential to harm others—that would not occur if investors had to bear 
the full costs themselves.  Presumably, state legislatures have made the 
judgment that the social benefits of increased business investment outweigh 
the costs of uncompensated injuries. 
The key policy question, again, is the appropriate magnitude of this 
subsidy.  The social cost of limited liability as to tort creditors is potentially 
extremely high.  Mass distribution of products with the capacity to harm their 
users is one element of this cost.  There can be harmful third-party effects on 
non-users too, as in the case of passive cigarette smoke inhalation.  Production 
and distribution on a large scale can also impose substantial costs on the 
general public, such as environmental pollution and transportation accidents. 
The problem of social cost is compounded by the fact that tort victims—
unlike contract creditors—typically lack the opportunity to bargain prior to 
“transacting” with a limited liability entity.  When that is the case, tort 
claimants have not received appropriate compensation ex ante for accepting 
the risk that a corporate tortfeasor will cause them harm and then be unable to 
satisfy a judgment.  Tort victims must therefore seek compensation ex post, 
and if the corporation lacks sufficient resources, they will be left to bear the 
uncompensated costs of injury themselves. 
In light of the social costs of harmful activity, limited liability for tort 
claims should not be thought of as an all-or-nothing proposition.  Academic 
 
 138 See supra Part I.C. 
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debate has been cast in those terms,139 but in fact limited liability can and 
should be tailored so as to provide protection for shareholders in some cases 
but not in others.  If that is to happen, though, the tailoring needs to be done on 
the basis of well-considered public policy judgments rather than the randomly 
deployed epithets found in the case law.140  The key distinction should be 
about the reasonableness of the corporation’s efforts ex ante to provide 
compensation for potential accident victims, either through liability insurance 
or self-insurance.  A corporation acts reasonably if it provides sufficient 
compensation for harms likely to occur as a result of its business activities.  If 
it has done this, the shareholders should escape liability even if it turns out ex 
post that the proceeds of the insurance policy or the amount of the self-
insurance fund have proven to be inadequate.  In other words, limited liability 
should protect investors from judgments that are not payable despite the efforts 
of the corporation to act responsibly.  In contrast, an insurance policy with a 
coverage limit that is unreasonably low in light of the nature of the 
corporation’s business should result in shareholder liability.  Similarly, 
shareholders should be held responsible to tort victims where the corporation 
has relied on a self-insurance fund that is unreasonably meager.  The law 
should not encourage deliberate or reckless failure to cover the reasonably 
anticipated costs of doing business by allowing business owners to seek refuge 
behind the limited liability shield. 
Sometimes corporate activity results in greater harm to third parties than 
the owners of the business could reasonably be expected to have anticipated.  
Having considered seriously the appropriate coverage limit (or the amount of a 
self-insurance fund), limited liability should protect business owners if their 
reasonable efforts prove to be inadequate.  If it is to have any bearing at all on 
tort claims, limited liability surely seems warranted here.  By definition, there 
is no basis for believing that the owners of the business should have managed 
it differently so as to have prevented the problem.  The only way to avoid the 
loss would have been to overinsure, out of concern for third-party harm of a 
magnitude that reasonable people would consider unlikely to occur.  Even so, 
business owners know that virtually anything is possible.  Without the limited 
liability shield, the possibility of a massive tort judgment—however remote—
would lead prudent people either to overinsure or to decide against engaging in 
an otherwise profitable business venture.  Neither alternative is socially 
 
 139 See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6; Leebron, supra note 6 (both arguing for unlimited 
liability as to corporate torts). 
 140 See supra Part II.B. 
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desirable.  Limited liability in this context thus has the effect of shielding 
business owners from the costs of the unexpected.  Even if restricted to 
scenarios like this, limited liability would still provide a meaningful benefit 
and therefore would encourage business investment that otherwise would not 
occur. 
One could imagine a policy that extended limited liability even to situations 
in which shareholders have knowingly or recklessly imposed costs on third 
parties without providing compensation.  Certainly protection from liability in 
cases like these would mean a potentially higher return on shareholders’ 
investments.  Presumably that should translate into higher rates of 
entrepreneurial activity.  Investors stand to benefit, and there would be third-
party gains, too, such as job creation and provision of attractive goods to 
consumers at lower prices.  Despite these benefits, however, efficiency as well 
as fairness considerations suggest that limited liability should not extend so far.  
Absent limited liability, investors would restrict themselves to business 
activities whose potential gains exceed potential third-party harms for which 
they could be held responsible under tort law doctrines.  With liability limited 
to whatever capital they have contributed to their corporation, shareholders are 
encouraged to engage in potentially harmful activity even if the costs to third 
parties are greater than the benefits to themselves.  The expected value of such 
activities need only exceed the amount of capital they have placed at risk in the 
corporation.141  Even factoring in potential benefits to nonshareholders, overly 
broad limited liability ensures that shareholders will engage in business 
activities without regard to the magnitude of their social costs and the relation 
of those costs to shareholder and third-party benefits.  There is no reason to 
expect efficient outcomes. 
In addition, overly broad limited liability presents questions of basic 
fairness.  Protecting shareholders from responsibility for deliberate or reckless 
infliction of harm on third parties will result in losses without the opportunity 
to engage in ex ante bargaining and without the assurance of adequate ex post 
compensation.  Uncompensated personal injury or property damage is justified 
solely by reference to the instrumental value of increased business investment.  
Our traditional values generally disapprove of this form of moral argument. 
As currently employed by courts, veil piercing in tort cases represents an 
acknowledgment that tailoring of limited liability so as to reduce its social 
 
 141 See supra Part III.A.2.b. 
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costs is appropriate under certain circumstances.  However, courts pierce the 
corporate veil for the benefit of tort creditors only occasionally and do so on an 
ad hoc basis with insufficient regard for these larger public policy questions.  
In the contract context opportunism implies deliberate efforts to use corporate 
control in ways that thwart the bargained-for expectations of corporate 
creditors and allow shareholders to extract value beyond that for which they 
have paid compensation.  The operative distinction should turn on judgments 
about responsible use of control and due regard for legitimate, already 
established creditor interests.  These ideas are developed more fully below.142  
Opportunism implies similar considerations in the tort context.  Courts ought 
to ask whether the shareholders have conducted their business in a manner that 
irresponsibly shifts the costs of the business to other parties.143  As with 
contract creditors, the challenge is to define shareholder responsibility in a way 
that appropriately mediates the conflicting goals of business subsidization on 
the one hand and respect for legitimate third-party interests on the other.  I 
confront these challenges below.144  First, however, it is necessary to consider 
whether the policy objective advocated here can be achieved without resort to 
veil piercing. 
C. Should Veil Piercing Be Abolished? 
One can accept that limited liability should not be respected in all cases 
involving insolvent corporate debtors without necessarily accepting the need 
for veil piercing under certain circumstances.  Scholars—most recently 
Professor Bainbridge145—have argued that established legal doctrines already 
exist that provide mechanisms for holding shareholders personally liable to 
corporate creditors in appropriate cases.  According to this view, the law of 
fraudulent misrepresentation and of fraudulent conveyance are adequate to the 
task of policing abuse of limited liability and therefore obviate the need for veil 
piercing.146  While I share Professor Bainbridge’s frustration with current veil-
piercing jurisprudence,147 these doctrines would not adequately address the 
financial responsibility concerns discussed above. 
 
 142 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 143 See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 144 See infra Part IV.B–C. 
 145 See Bainbridge, supra note 10. 
 146 See id. at 517–23.  Professor Bainbridge would, however, retain veil piercing in cases involving 
parent-subsidiary corporations.  Id. at 534. 
 147 See id. at 506–14 (explaining that veil piercing is a “dysfunctional doctrine”). 
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The doctrines identified by Professor Bainbridge do reach some cases of 
opportunistic exploitation of limited liability.  If a business owner lies about 
the corporation’s current financial condition or future prospects to induce the 
extension of credit, he may be held liable under ordinary tort principles.148  
Similarly, if shareholders withdraw assets from a corporation to defeat creditor 
claims on those assets, fraudulent conveyance law may allow creditors to insist 
that the shareholders return those assets to the corporation.149 
Actions for misrepresentation and fraudulent conveyance would not, 
however, reach all of the cases in which shareholders have used limited 
liability in ways that offend public policy.  As argued above,150 shareholders 
who cause the corporation to incur debt while knowing that repayment is 
impossible or highly unlikely arguably should be treated differently from those 
whose corporations default despite their good faith efforts to manage the 
business in a financially responsible manner.  If so, however, they would not 
be subject to liability under common law fraud principles if there has been no 
misrepresentation.  Similarly, shareholders also act opportunistically if they 
commit the corporation to a project with expected return lower than cost.  The 
lender arguably has been dealt with unfairly and the claims of existing 
creditors are devalued.  Again, however, there is no basis for liability based on 
fraud if there has been no false statement.  Nor is there any basis for a 
fraudulent conveyance claim where the shareholders have not used their 
control to transfer assets with the intention of defeating creditor claims. 
In the tort context, the distinction is between shareholders who cause their 
corporation to engage in activities that are likely to be harmful to third parties 
while knowing that the corporation will be unable to pay compensation and 
those whose corporations end up unable to compensate the victim of a loss so 
large that it is unreasonable to expect them to have provided for it.  Although 
courts sometimes use the term “fraud” in the loose sense of inequitable 
conduct in cases like this,151 in fact there is no basis for a common law fraud 
claim because no one has been misled.  Fraudulent conveyance doctrine also 
has no bearing here. 
 
 148 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 726–29 (5th ed. 1984) 
(discussing elements of action for deceit). 
 149 See CLARK, supra note 102, at 43–44. 
 150 See supra Part III.A.2. 
 151 See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
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If one accepts my views about the appropriate limits of limited liability, 
courts will need to continue to use veil piercing as the mechanism for denial of 
the limited liability shield in certain circumstances.  Common law doctrines of 
misrepresentation and fraudulent conveyance can effectively police some cases 
of shareholder abuse but they are not broad enough to do the job completely.  
The following section develops more fully an approach for the use of veil 
piercing to tailor the scope of limited liability. 
IV.   VEIL PIERCING AND TAILORED LIMITED LIABILITY 
My proposal is that courts should respect limited liability as long as the 
shareholders have managed the business in a “financially responsible” manner.  
If, instead, corporate insolvency is the result of “financially irresponsible” 
conduct, piercing the corporate veil is appropriate.  Once veil piercing is 
placed on a sound conceptual footing, current objections to the doctrine based 
on its vagueness and unpredictability will no longer apply. 
Financial responsibility means management of the business based on a 
good faith, reasonable belief that the corporation will be able to satisfy creditor 
claims in a timely manner.  To deal responsibly with contract creditors, at the 
time the corporation assumes a debt those in control of the business need to 
have good reasons to believe that the business will be able to meet the 
obligation when it comes due.  Having incurred an obligation, they will also 
need to manage the business in a way that does not unreasonably increase the 
risk of corporate default on existing claims.  As to potential tort creditors, the 
shareholders should provide the corporation with the means to satisfy claims 
that are reasonably likely to occur.  Ordinarily they will do so by means of 
liability insurance. 
A. The Question of Control 
Before elaborating on the meaning of financial responsibility in the 
contexts of contract and tort creditors, it is first necessary to address the 
importance of control in relation to questions of shareholder liability.  If a 
court is going to pierce a corporation’s limited liability veil, it should only do 
so as to shareholders who have actually caused the corporation to act in a 
financially irresponsible manner.  This is because the essence of the veil-
piercing judgment should be a finding that shareholders have used their control 
of a corporation so as to shift the costs of a corporation’s insolvency over to its 
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creditors in an unreasonable manner.  Shareholders who are not at fault in this 
way should not lose the protection of statutory limited liability. 
Unlike partners in a general partnership,152 corporate shareholders do not 
participate in control of the firm simply by virtue of their status as such.153  
Instead, they exercise control only indirectly, through their ability to elect 
members of the corporation’s board of directors at the annual meeting.154  
Sometimes one or more shareholders with the voting power to elect the 
corporation’s board will use that prerogative to install themselves in positions 
of control.  They can do this by choosing a board that will appoint them to 
senior management offices.  Even if they are content to rely on others to 
exercise managerial authority, shareholders with the voting power to determine 
the composition of the senior management should be treated as if they 
themselves control the business.  Ordinary principles of agency law justify this 
result. 
Majority shareholders should be presumed to control their corporations and 
therefore should be subject to veil-piercing claims if it can be shown that they 
have caused the business to be managed in a financially irresponsible manner.  
One can imagine cases in which a majority shareholder—perhaps for reasons 
of illness or advanced age—is unable or chooses not to exercise the power that 
goes with majority interest and has played no role in the selection of 
management, but such cases probably are rare.  Ordinarily, the fact of a 
substantial investment creates an incentive to exercise control over business 
decisions.  It is also possible that a majority shareholder, even though not 
actively involved in management or the selection of management, may know 
or have reason to know that those who are in control are running the business 
in a financially irresponsible manner.155  Depending on the circumstances, veil 
piercing could attach in such cases as well. 
 
 152 See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(e) (1914). 
 153 Some statutes allow election of special close corporation status providing for management by 
shareholders and elimination of the board of directors.  See, e.g., MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPP. 
(1984). 
 154 See, e.g., REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1984) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by 
or under the authority of the board of directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the 
corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of . . . its board of directors . . . .”). 
 155 See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981) (director who was also the 
corporation’s largest shareholder neglected her duties because she should have known that her sons were 
stealing from the corporation). 
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In contrast, minority shareholders voting on their own normally are unable 
to influence the outcome of corporate elections.156  Ordinarily, therefore, they 
should not be subject to veil-piercing claims.  Exceptions should be made, 
however, in cases in which two or more minority shareholders working in 
concert are able to determine the outcome of a corporate election.  It is also 
possible to imagine that an individual minority shareholder—perhaps due to 
family relationships or the passivity of the other shareholders, for example—
may be able to select the board or exert influence over a board that has been 
formally elected by the other shareholders.  A minority shareholder may also 
find himself appointed to a senior management position by those with the 
power to determine such matters.  If there is significant involvement in control, 
even minority shareholders should be liable for the consequences of financial 
irresponsibility. 
As a practical matter, limiting personal liability to claims against 
controlling shareholders probably means that most veil-piercing cases will fall 
into one of two categories.  On the one hand are those involving closely held 
corporations owned by one shareholder or a small number of shareholders one 
or more of whom is identifiably in control of the business and therefore 
potentially liable under a veil-piercing theory.  The other likely scenario is the 
claim brought against the corporate parent of a wholly owned or majority-
owned subsidiary corporation.  In such cases, the parent controls the subsidiary 
through its ability to elect the latter’s board of directors. 
A third category involves the more unusual case of the publicly held 
corporation that is controlled by a single shareholder.  If the shares are 
dispersed widely enough, a percentage interest of less than half—perhaps quite 
a bit less than half—may be sufficient as a practical matter to determine the 
outcome of the annual election.157  Such a shareholder could be a natural 
person or another corporation.  It is also possible that a small number of 
minority shareholders whose holdings together total less than 50% may 
nevertheless through joint action control the election of the board.  Under the 
theory proposed in this Article, controlling shareholders of public corporations 
could also find themselves subject to a veil-piercing claim. 
 
 156 Even cumulative voting will not allow a minority shareholder to elect a majority of the board.  A 
minority shareholder must act in concert with other shareholders if he is to participate in control through the 
voting process. 
 157 Many public corporation shareholders do not bother to vote in the annual election.  For that reason, a 
holding of less than a majority can confer control power on its holder. 
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It is necessary to emphasize that controlling shareholders under any of the 
three scenarios described above would not necessarily be personally liable for 
an insolvent corporation’s obligations.  In this respect my proposal differs from 
that of Professor Mendelson, who argues in a recent article that the fact of 
control should itself be sufficient to subject shareholders to personal liability 
for corporate torts or statutory violations in cases of corporate insolvency.158  
Professor Mendelson emphasizes limited liability’s potential to encourage 
excessive risk taking.159  Assigning liability to those shareholders who in effect 
make such decisions forces them to internalize the social costs of corporate 
activity and thereby eliminates limited liability’s moral hazard problem.160 
As developed further below,161 Professor Mendelson is correct to 
emphasize the importance of excessive risk taking.  However, she goes too far 
in threatening controlling shareholders with liability without regard to whether 
the decision in question was truly an irresponsible one.162  Professor 
Mendelson overlooks the possibility that a corporation may inflict losses that 
are not compensable by the corporation despite the good faith efforts of the 
controlling shareholders to provide compensation ex ante.  If a third party’s 
loss exceeds the amount that reasonably was anticipated when a liability 
insurance policy was purchased, it is not the result of efforts to take advantage 
of limited liability.  It is instead the incidental by-product of business activity 
conducted by shareholders who have attempted in good faith to provide 
compensation for victims of known risks. 
It is true that requiring controlling shareholders to compensate third parties 
will discourage irresponsible risk taking.  However, it will also discourage any 
corporate activity that has the potential to harm third parties in unpredictable 
ways.  Limited liability has a legitimate role to play in the encouragement of 
business activity by shielding investors from responsibility for injuries that 
exceed reasonably anticipated limits.  Presumably it leads to business 
investment that otherwise would not occur.  Even though particular 
corporations may end up generating social costs that exceed the sum of 
shareholder and third-party gains, policymakers might decide reasonably that 
the aggregate benefit of increased business investment exceeds occasional 
 
 158 See Mendelson, supra note 35. 
 159 Id. at 1232–35. 
 160 Id. at 1271–72. 
 161 See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 162 Mendelson, supra note 35, at 1249–58. 
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uncompensated losses caused by firms that generate social costs in excess of 
social gains. 
Under this view of the matter, limited liability for torts can be defensible in 
certain cases, even if the corporation is controlled by a single shareholder or a 
group working in concert. In addition to going too far in the case of tort 
claimants, Professor Mendelson’s proposal does not go far enough with regard 
to possible shareholder liability for contract-based claims because her article 
takes no position on possible personal liability for such claims.163  As 
explained above,164 limited liability presents moral hazard problems here, too.  
As with veil-piercing claims based on tort, a finding of control should be 
required, but control itself, while necessary, should not be sufficient to 
establish liability. 
B. Contract Creditors 
1. Financial Responsibility Defined 
Courts should not pierce the corporate veil where shareholders have acted 
responsibly.  Financial responsibility in the contract context has two aspects.  
The first focuses on the shareholders’ expectations at the time the corporation 
assumes an obligation.  A court should determine whether the shareholders 
believed in good faith that the corporation would be able to discharge this 
obligation in a timely manner.  The belief needs also to have been reasonable 
under the circumstances.  Shareholders who have caused their corporation to 
assume an obligation that it later ends up unable to pay should be able to 
provide a satisfactory answer to the question, what were you thinking when 
you made this decision? 
At the time an obligation is incurred, responsible decision making requires 
that managers think carefully about whether the business will be able to handle 
the obligation in question.  Such decisions cannot be made on the basis of 
impressionistic evaluation, guess work, or mere wishful thinking.  Instead, 
managers need to make thoughtful, well-grounded predictions about the 
business’s future performance.  These predictions can be more or less elaborate 
in form, but ordinarily the managers should generate revenue projections to be 
 
 163 See id. at 1204 n.1. 
 164 See supra Part III.A.2. 
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viewed in conjunction with the firm’s existing and anticipated liabilities.165  
Sales forecasting is a complex task.  Businesses with a track record usually 
look to recent sales on the assumption that these data provide the most reliable 
basis for projecting near-term future performance.166  However, the relevance 
of trends or cycles and one-time gains or losses within those data can 
complicate the exercise and require use of reasoned judgment, as can decisions 
about whether to weight the relatively more recent data more heavily than the 
relatively more remote.167  Of course, it will be necessary to take into account 
the additional (i.e., variable) costs involved in production of additional units. 
For the start-up or recently launched business, the absence of a track record 
makes forecasting even more difficult.  Managers must rely on estimates of 
future sales.  It will also be necessary to rely on projections of cost-of-goods 
sold values and other expenses.  Qualitative analysis ordinarily is used, 
including industry data, market research, and expert opinion.168 
In deciding whether a business can afford additional indebtedness, it is not 
enough simply to rely on revenue and cost projections.  Pro forma income 
statements predicting a profitable future may be well-grounded, but liquidity 
problems could still arise and potentially result in financial distress.  
Shareholders need to bear in mind that even a profitable corporation may have 
trouble paying its debts in a timely manner out of its revenues.  For example, 
sales of a retail business may be seasonal or customers may buy on credit; in 
either case, the business may show increasing revenues but actual cash flow 
may be uneven.  Accordingly, having developed pro forma income statements 
for future accounting periods, the managers need also to create a pro forma 
cash budget.  This document projects future cash receipts and expenditures on 
a monthly basis and reveals whether the business will need additional cash to 
cover cash flow shortfalls.169  This can be supplied from a bank-financed line 
of credit or some other source, such as short-term shareholders’ loans.170  If 
those in control of the business have not thought carefully about cash flow 
 
 165 For example, the Small Business Administration recommends that prospective borrowers provide 
projected income and cash flow statements extending two or three years into the future.  See Small Business 
Administration, http://www.sba.gov/smallbusinessplanner/start/financestartup/SERV_LOANPROPOSAL.html 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2007). 
 166 See ADELMAN & MARKS, supra note 117, at 113. 
 167 See id. at 115–20 (presenting several forecasting models). 
 168 See id. at 112–14. 
 169 See id. at 130–31; see also WILLIAM D. BYGRAVE, THE PORTABLE MBA IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP 233–
34 (1994) (discussing need for detailed “cash forecast”). 
 170 See ADELMAN & MARKS, supra note 117, at 131–32, 162–63. 
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questions and the business later ends up insolvent, a court should not conclude 
that the decision to incur additional indebtedness was made in a responsible 
manner. 
Financial responsibility is not only a matter of reasonable shareholder 
expectations about future revenues, expenses, and cash flows as of the time the 
corporation undertakes a new obligation.  Managers must also act responsibly 
toward creditors during the period between the incurrence of the debt and its 
maturity.  That means that the shareholders should not cause the corporation to 
engage in conduct that significantly increases the risk of default that each 
creditor has agreed to assume.  Primarily this is a matter of ensuring that the 
corporation has sufficient liquid working capital.171  Analysts have 
traditionally considered a current ratio—the ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities—of 2:1 to be optimal,172 but regard must also be paid to liquidity 
concerns.  A firm’s working capital can be inadequate if it does not include 
sufficient liquid assets, especially when inventory or accounts receivable are 
not regularly and reliably converted into cash.173  Accordingly, even if a 
business appears to have an adequate working capital surplus, distributions of 
cash to shareholders can threaten its ability to meet its current obligations.  
Incurrence of additional indebtedness can also have this effect if due regard is 
not paid to liquid working capital.  Maintenance of established internal or 
external short-term financing options may be necessary to protect against cash 
flow difficulties.  In addition, investment of borrowed funds in projects with 
expected return lower than cost increases the risk that existing creditors will 
not be paid.174  Generally speaking, courts should be willing to look closely at 
behavior that unreasonably reduces the value of creditor’s claims. 
It is important to bear in mind that financial responsibility in relation to a 
firm’s indebtedness can mean different things under differing circumstances.  
Responsibility does not demand that shareholders maintain large hordes of 
cash in the corporation’s bank account.  Subject to working capital needs, cash 
ordinarily should be invested in productive assets.175  Nor does it require them 
 
 171 One text states that small firms “are often undercapitalized and overdependent on uninterrupted cash 
receipts to pay for recurring expenses.”  WILLIAM L. MEGGINSON ET AL., SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT: AN 
ENTREPRENEUR’S GUIDEBOOK (3d ed. 2000). 
 172 See, e.g., STANLEY SIEGEL & DAVID A. SIEGEL, ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 108 
(1983).  Current assets include cash, marketable securities, accounts receivable, and inventory.  Id. at 22.  
Current liabilities are liabilities that must be paid within a year.  Id. at 23. 
 173 See BYGRAVE, supra note 169, at 198–99. 
 174 See supra text accompanying note 122. 
 175 See, e.g., ADELMAN & MARKS, supra note 117, at 142–44. 
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to manage the business with the aversion to risk of a bank trust officer.  No 
business can flourish without at least some amount of borrowing.  Recognizing 
that reasonable assessments about a corporation’s ability to meet its obligations 
can be more or less aggressive, what counts as responsible behavior in a given 
situation probably can accommodate a range of choices.  Creditors themselves 
make evaluations of the relative riskiness of various extensions of credit based 
on a business’s financial statements and other data and then adjust interest 
rates accordingly and require personal guarantees when deemed necessary.  
The key point simply is that shareholders’ decisions about the corporation’s 
ability to repay debts need to be realistic and based on reasonable evaluation of 
the firm’s prospects and challenges, rather than on guess work or wishful 
thinking.  The distinction should be between fact-based assessments of the 
future and those that are utopian, fantastic, or merely offhand.  Optimism, 
unless excessive under the circumstances, does not necessarily imply 
irresponsibility because confidence often distinguishes successful 
entrepreneurs. 
Despite the emphasis that it receives in the case law,176 financial 
responsibility does not necessarily have anything to do with “adequacy of 
capitalization.”  To the extent that they explain their use of the term, courts 
generally refer to the amount of capital contributed to the business by its 
shareholders at the time of formation.177  However, even substantial initial 
capitalization may be insufficient to prevent insolvency if the firm has taken on 
large liabilities.  Moreover, an otherwise strong balance sheet may signal 
inability to pay debts if most of the assets are illiquid and cash flows are 
uncertain.  It is also possible that initially substantial capital contributions have 
been depleted through payment to third parties or distribution to the 
shareholders.  On the other hand, relatively small initial capitalization need not 
jeopardize a corporation’s ability to pay its debts if revenues are robust and 
reliable.  Retained earnings (or reasonably liquid assets purchased by means of 
earnings) can also compensate for thin initial capitalization. 
Certainly the fact that a corporation has ended up insolvent does not itself 
indicate that the business has been run in a financially irresponsible manner.  
Managers may reasonably believe that their business will be able to pay its 
debts, but business failure can still occur despite their best efforts and without 
 
 176 See supra Part II.C.3. 
 177 See, e.g., J.L. Brock Builders, Inc. v. Dahlbeck, 391 N.W.2d 110, 115 (Neb. 1986) (“Inadequate 
capitalization is measured at the time of formation.” (quoting J-R Grain Co. v. FAC, Inc., 627 F.2d 129, 135 
(8th Cir. 1980))). 
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their having done anything to bring about that outcome.  Reasonable 
assumptions about cash flows and adequacy of working capital may prove to 
be false due to unanticipated developments.  In short, insolvency does not 
necessarily indicate deliberate misbehavior or careless mismanagement.  
Courts need to avoid the misleading clarity of hindsight and instead evaluate 
decisions as of the time they were made. 
2. Creditor Self-Protection? 
One might concede the utility of financial responsibility as a concept but 
still argue that veil piercing is unnecessary as an enforcement mechanism 
because contract creditors can protect themselves from these risks by 
investigation of borrowers’ creditworthiness and inclusion of appropriate 
provisions in their contracts with the corporation.  At the time credit is 
extended, it may be possible to obtain information about a corporation’s 
expected future cash flows and current working capital status by insisting on 
pro forma financial statements.  However, the assumptions and projections that 
lie behind such information are likely to be complex and therefore very costly 
to access.  Borrowers may also consider some of this information to be 
confidential.  If potential creditors are to be left entirely to their own devices, 
they would also need detailed information about the industry in which the 
business operates and about the people who are responsible for its 
management.  The costs to both lender and borrower could be so high as to 
render the transaction in question unprofitable for both parties. 
An alternative would be to eschew efforts to collect all this information and 
instead simply attempt to price credit according to general assumptions about 
likely rates of default.  However, creditors are generally unable ex ante to 
distinguish those borrowers who are careless in their undertaking of credit 
obligations or who are likely to behave opportunistically from those who are 
responsible and competent.178  This will lead creditors to demand higher 
interest rates (perhaps coupled with personal guarantees) from all borrowers 
than they would demand if discrimination were possible.  The increase in the 
cost of credit for all borrowers indicates the inefficiency of a contract-based 
solution to the risk of financial irresponsibility. 
Furthermore, even if creditors could obtain accurate information about the 
likelihood of default and adjust the interest rate accordingly, they typically are 
 
 178 See supra Part III.B.2.b. 
2007] PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 1369 
in no position to use ex ante bargaining to secure protection from financial 
irresponsibility that may occur thereafter.  This is so because drafting and 
monitoring costs are likely to be excessively high.  As a practical matter, it is 
not feasible for a prospective creditor to attempt to draft a contract that 
includes specific prohibitions on all of the sorts of conduct that might increase 
the risk of default.  Such a contract would need to include provisions requiring 
maintenance of particular working capital and liquid asset balances.  
Restrictions on additional borrowing and on distributions to shareholders 
would also be necessary.  All of these provisions would have to be drafted in a 
way that allows sufficient flexibility for the legitimate needs of a business that 
ordinarily is attempting to grow and must be able to respond to a range of 
future exigencies.  Insistence on certain dollar amounts, percentages, or ratios 
is therefore likely to be too rigid.  Even if possible, the drafting and negotiation 
process would certainly be expensive.  Standard-form or boilerplate language 
does not exist to deal with these issues in a close corporation setting.179 
Elaborate restrictions on the borrower’s freedom of action would also 
require monitoring if they are to be of any value.  Because any expenditure, 
distribution, or borrowing can potentially affect a corporation’s ability to pay 
its debts, effective monitoring would need to be both pervasive and highly 
intrusive.  It seems unlikely that typical borrowers or lenders would be willing 
to commit to such a costly regime.  In addition to transaction and monitoring 
cost considerations, restrictions on the debtor’s freedom of action and 
intrusions on its privacy will also come at a price.  Creditors therefore must 
expect less compensation (i.e., a lower interest rate) than they might otherwise 
claim.  Added to the drafting, negotiation, and monitoring expenses, this cost 
will further reduce the net value of any contractual protections that are actually 
achievable. 
Potential transaction and monitoring costs are important because they may 
be so high as to render contractual self-protection unworthy of the cost.  Even 
if these costs are not prohibitively high, this solution to the problem of creditor 
irresponsibility will still involve significant expense for both parties and to that 
extent is inefficient.  A tailored approach to limited liability that denies 
protection to shareholders who have used their power of control irresponsibly 
is likely to do a better job of protecting creditors from this problem. 
 
 179 Contrast the public corporation setting, in which elaborate standard form contracts (called indentures) 
protect the interest of members of the public who lend funds to corporate borrowers by purchasing bonds and 
other debt securities.  See generally KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 31, at 242–46. 
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3. Example: The Bartle Case 
A well-known case illustrates the financial responsibility idea in the 
piercing context.  In the Bartle case,180 a group of World War II veterans had 
formed a cooperative corporation, Home Owners Cooperative, for the purpose 
of building homes for themselves and their families.  The veterans contributed 
the land for the project to this corporation.  Unable to find a suitable general 
contractor, they then organized another corporation, called Westerlea Builders, 
to serve as general contractor.  Westerlea was formed as a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Home Owners.  The veterans apparently contributed some cash 
to the subsidiary initially, but this was soon exhausted.  Thereafter, the only 
funds flowing into Westerlea were those paid by the veterans to Home Owners 
when they bought the houses; the co-op then transferred these funds to 
Westerlea.  The selling prices for the houses were set solely by reference to 
actual building costs, which meant that Westerlea’s revenues were limited to 
the precise amounts necessary to pay the subcontractors and suppliers of 
materials.  Westerlea therefore could earn no profits and could accumulate no 
cash.  Once its initial capital had been paid out to creditors, it had no equity.  
Westerlea was essentially an empty shell serving as a conduit for the flow of 
funds from the veterans to the subcontractors and suppliers. 
Even though Westerlea had no capital reserves, it continued to deal on a 
credit basis with subcontractors and suppliers.  Being wholly dependent on 
sales of the houses for its revenues, if the veterans should be unable to pay for 
the completed houses, the revenues would dry up.  So, if building and material 
costs increased to the point that the veterans were no longer able to afford 
them, Westerlea was certain to default on its obligations.  This is precisely 
what occurred.  The creditors therefore sought to pierce the corporate veil of 
Westerlea, the insolvent corporation with which they had dealt, to hold 
Westerlea’s shareholder (Home Owners) liable.  Home Owners, the insolvent 
debtor corporation’s sole shareholder, apparently held title to the land on 
which the houses were being built and therefore was capable of satisfying a 
judgment against Westerlea.181 
The trial court refused to allow the claims against Westerlea’s corporate 
shareholder and the New York state intermediate appellate court and Court of 
Appeals agreed.  The high court concluded a brief majority opinion with this 
statement: 
 
 180 Bartle v. Home Owners Coop., Inc., 127 N.E.2d 832 (N.Y. 1955). 
 181 Id. at 833. 
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The law permits the incorporation of a business for the very purpose 
of escaping personal liability.  Generally speaking, the doctrine of 
“piercing the corporate veil” is invoked “to prevent fraud or to 
achieve equity.”  But in the instant case there has been neither fraud, 
misrepresentation nor illegality.  Defendant’s purpose in placing its 
construction operation into a separate corporation was clearly within 
the limits of our public policy.182 
Even by the low standards of the veil-piercing cases, this well-known opinion 
does little more than state an unsupported conclusion.  A more thoughtful 
approach to the facts might have led the New York courts to entertain a 
different result. 
Once Westerlea’s modest initial capital had been paid out, it must have 
been apparent to the shareholders of the corporate parent that Westerlea had no 
equity and would not accumulate any as long as the veterans paid for the 
houses at cost.  If building costs became too high, payments into Westerlea 
would cease.  Accordingly, as Westerlea continued to deal on credit, the 
shareholders imposed on the creditors the risk that they would not get paid if 
the shareholders themselves could not afford the building costs. 
Presumably building costs did not rise beyond manageable levels 
overnight.  If, as seems likely, increases were more or less gradual, the 
veterans must have continued to cause Westerlea to assume obligations even as 
it became increasingly apparent to them that the risk of nonpayment was 
growing.  They did this while Westerlea had no working capital reserves that it 
could fall back on in the event that revenues suddenly dried up.  There is no 
indication in the reported opinions that the veterans continued to accept labor 
and materials intending deliberately not to pay for them.183  However, even if 
the veterans believed in good faith that the upward trend in building costs was 
only temporary and would soon level off or even decline, it is hard to imagine 
that at some point they did not realize—as costs were continuing to rise—that 
it would be hard if not impossible to pay the bills.  That the cost increases may 
have been unforeseeable at the time the veterans embarked on the house-
building scheme does not alter this conclusion because they continued to 
accept credit even as the risk of default must have become increasingly 
obvious. 
 
 182 Id. (citations omitted). 
 183 See id. 
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Under these circumstances, the New York courts should have been willing 
to ask whether the shareholders of the corporate parent acted responsibly.  
Limited liability should not have protected them from creditor claims unless 
they had good reasons to believe that they would be able to afford the houses 
despite rising costs.  If not, the continued acceptance of value with no plausible 
likelihood of payment was irresponsible behavior that corporate law should not 
be interpreted to encourage.184  Even if a court were reluctant to hold the 
veterans themselves personally liable, in this case an intermediate solution was 
available because the veil-piercing claim, being directed at the debtor’s 
corporate parent, only sought to reach a portion of their wealth, namely their 
interests in the assets owned by Home Owners.185 
One might respond that veil piercing was inappropriate in this case because 
the creditors got what they bargained for.  Having voluntarily accepted the risk 
of nonpayment under these circumstances, they should not have been allowed 
after the fact to seek recovery from the insolvent debtor’s corporate parent or 
its shareholders.  The flaw in this argument is an assumption that the creditors 
knew the full magnitude of the risk they were undertaking as they continued to 
extend credit to Westerlea.  Whether they would get paid depended ultimately 
on the ability of the veterans to pay for the houses, which of course was a 
function of their wealth.  Unless the creditors had a reasonably clear idea of the 
upper limits on the veterans’ financial resources, which seems unlikely, courts 
should not conclude that they knowingly assumed a particular risk of default in 
return for appropriate compensation. 
Nor should they conclude that failure to demand guarantees from the 
shareholders individually or from Home Owners represented a reasoned 
decision based on adequate information.  To the contrary, it seems unlikely 
that the creditors had access to information about the veteran’s personal 
finances.  Even if they had demanded that the veterans hire accountants to 
prepare individual financial statements, that information would not itself 
necessarily have indicated the degree of risk the subcontractors and suppliers 
were undertaking because such documents would not necessarily have 
provided information bearing directly on the veteran’s future ability to meet 
 
 184 Thought of in this way, the plaintiffs’ claim may not have been an all-or-nothing proposition.  A court 
willing to entertain the veil-piercing claim should have considered liability only as to those amounts accepted 
on credit by Westerlea after the veterans knew or reasonably should have known that they would not be able to 
pay. 
 185 A claim against the veterans themselves would have required the piercing of two corporate veils—
Westerlea’s and Home Owners’. 
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higher building costs.  Nor would the creditors have occasion to know about 
the availability to the veterans of financing from another source such as a 
bank.186  In fact, Westerlea’s continuing willingness to take on indebtedness 
even as costs were rising could have misled the creditors into believing that the 
veterans were wealthier than they really were.  Although there was no actual 
misrepresentation, Westerlea’s behavior could have been interpreted by the 
subcontractors and suppliers as an implied assurance that the veterans had the 
means to buy the houses despite rising costs and thereby make it possible for 
Westerlea to pay its bills.  In short, there was a serious question as to the 
veterans’ financial responsibility.  Had the New York courts taken this concept 
seriously, it is possible that the outcome would have been different. 
C. Tort Creditors 
1. Financial Responsibility Defined 
In its details, the financial responsibility idea means something different as 
to tort claimants than as to contract creditors, but the core idea is the same.  
The question in both contexts should be whether those in control of a 
corporation have opportunistically shifted the risk of corporate insolvency on 
to third parties.  In the contract setting, shareholders act opportunistically if 
they cause the corporation to incur an obligation that they cannot reasonably 
expect it will be able to pay or if they increase unreasonably the risk of default 
on an obligation that was properly entered into.  In either case, the point is that 
creditor losses result from deliberate or careless decisions that render contract 
creditors vulnerable to risks they have not accepted.  Losses result from 
controlling shareholders’ conduct rather than from causes over which they 
have no control and for which they therefore should not be held accountable. 
Potential tort victims are in a similar position.  If those in control of a 
corporation cause it to engage in conduct that is likely to result in injury to 
third parties, they act irresponsibly if the corporation lacks the means to pay 
compensation through liability insurance or cash reserves.  As with contract 
creditors whose losses are due to shareholder opportunism, uncompensated tort 
losses result from shareholder action that harms third parties who have not 
agreed to bear the risk of those losses.  In contrast, managers have not acted 
 
 186 The creditors may also have assumed that the veterans considered Westerlea and Home Owners to be a 
single entity even though they were incorporated separately or had created Westerlea to serve as an agent for 
the corporate principal.  In either event, the land owned by the latter would arguably have been available to 
satisfy their claims. 
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irresponsibly if they have provided for compensation sufficient to satisfy likely 
claims, that is, claims that are likely to arise in the normal course of business.  
Sometimes an injury may occur that involves a loss greater than the 
shareholders could reasonably have anticipated.  As long as the available 
insurance fund, viewed ex ante, was reasonable in amount when established, 
limited liability should shield shareholders from liability for losses exceeding 
the available coverage. Where the failure to anticipate and provide for the 
unusually large claim was reasonable, injured parties should bear those excess 
costs themselves.  They have not agreed to bear the risk of these losses, but 
that is the price of the limited liability subsidy.  Their situation is analogous to 
that of the contract creditor unable to collect its claim because of corporate 
insolvency due to factors beyond the anticipation or control of the 
shareholders. 
This approach to limited liability in the tort context would narrow its scope.  
It would exclude shareholders who cause their corporations to engage in 
activities that are likely to harm others but decide as a matter of policy to make 
no provision for compensation, knowing that the corporation will be unable to 
satisfy a claim brought by an injured party and intending to hide behind the 
limited liability shield.  The same result would follow if the shareholders have 
simply failed to pay attention to the need to provide compensation for injured 
third parties.  As the likelihood of harm increases and therefore should be 
increasingly obvious, failure to consider third-party well-being looks more and 
more like the result of recklessness or even deliberate planning, even if there 
was no specific intent to inflict injury upon anyone.187 
As discussed above, overly broad limited liability encourages excessively 
risky business behavior.188  A financial responsibility requirement would 
reduce social costs while still addressing legitimate shareholder concerns over 
potentially massive tort liability that is unlikely to occur but is nevertheless 
theoretically possible.  As such, the approach proposed here represents a 
compromise between unlimited limited liability and a regime of shareholder 
personal liability for corporate torts.  Tort victims would still subsidize 
business owners, but the subsidy would be limited to losses arising out of 
unpredictably expensive accidents.  Limited liability therefore would still 
represent a genuine benefit to prospective entrepreneurs who fear being held 
responsible for third-party losses that they should not reasonably be expected 
 
 187 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 148, at 169–70. 
 188 See supra Part III.A.2.c. 
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to anticipate.  As to those, the magnitude of liability could be enormous but the 
shareholders were by definition in no position to take appropriate precautions 
to prevent the loss or obtain insurance to pay for it.  “No person can be 
expected to guard against harm from events which are not reasonably to be 
anticipated at all . . . .”189  Protection against these kinds of claims may well be 
the business owners’ greatest concern for the very reason that one cannot 
foresee all that fate may have in store.  Limited liability as to such claims 
therefore parallels limitation of protection from contract creditors to cases in 
which corporate insolvency results from business failure that could not be 
foreseen or prevented despite the owners’ good faith, reasonable efforts to 
manage their business responsibly. 
One problem with the concept of financial responsibility proposed here is 
its meaning in actual cases.  How can a court evaluating the matter ex post 
assess the reasonableness of business owners’ decisions to buy no more than a 
particular level of liability insurance?  After all, there is no controversy unless 
the amount of coverage has proven to be insufficient.  Nevertheless, the matter 
must be analyzed from the point of view of those who made the decision to 
buy a particular policy as of the time they made it. 
The meaning of reasonableness may be more difficult theoretically than in 
practice.  Most of the time, third-party injuries result from risks that are 
obvious and well-known.  Some business activities are virtually certain sooner 
or later to result in particular kinds of harm.  For example, a transportation 
business relying on motor vehicles eventually will be involved in a traffic 
accident in which some third party is hurt.  Excavation or demolition 
businesses that use explosives predictably can harm neighbors or bystanders.  
Food service businesses run the readily apparent risk that they may sell food 
that will cause sickness.  Everyone knows that manufactured products like toys 
or power tools can harm those who use them.  In each of these cases, it should 
not be difficult to identify a coverage limit sufficient to provide for the kinds of 
injuries that are likely to occur.  If coverage is significantly lower than the cost 
of a typical accident the situation is not that much different than a complete 
failure to obtain insurance or otherwise provide for likely tort claims.  The 
reasonableness claims may be implausible on its face. 
If there is doubt on the question, it will often be possible to assess 
shareholders’ claim of reasonableness by referring to the practices of other 
 
 189 KEETON ET AL., supra note 148, at 170. 
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firms in the same line of business.  How much liability insurance do they 
typically carry?  If a corporation can show that its insurance decision is in line 
with those of its peers, those data should provide a strong indicator of 
reasonableness.  Insurance companies would also be a good source of 
information on this question.  Additionally, if a corporation has a history of a 
particular kind of accident, it would be hard to assert a plausible claim of 
reasonableness if it does not have a liability policy with a limit high enough to 
satisfy these claims.  If, however, coverage has been sufficient in the past, the 
fact that a policy fails to provide sufficient funds for an unusually costly claim 
should not be enough to establish personal liability for the excess amount. 
Tailoring limited liability so as to create a de facto reasonable insurance 
requirement might seem to imply higher costs of doing business than would 
obtain if limited liability for corporate torts were available without exception.  
As a practical matter, though, restricting the scope of limited liability in this 
manner would not significantly raise the costs of doing business for most 
firms.  Entrepreneurs are advised to obtain insurance regardless of whether 
they are doing business in the corporate form or as a partnership or other entity 
form that does not provide limited liability.190  Although corporate statutes 
include the promise of limited liability, business owners know that courts may 
pierce the veil if they conclude that equity so requires.191  Prudent business 
practice therefore already includes purchase of liability insurance.192  A rule 
tailoring limited liability according to the shareholders’ financial responsibility 
thus would not necessarily mean higher costs than would obtain under a 
regime of unlimited limited liability.193  What it would do is help courts to 
understand when to pierce the veil in tort cases in which the corporation has 
insufficient resources to satisfy a claim. 
 
 190 See, e.g., BYGRAVE, supra note 169, at 311. 
 191 See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 8 (N.Y. 1966) (“[C]ourts will disregard the corporate 
form . . . to prevent fraud or to achieve equity.”) (citation omitted). 
 192 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16, at 47–49. 
 193 Professors Hansmann and Kraakman note that most businesses do obtain liability insurance despite 
limited liability but suggest that underinsurance—purchase of policies with relatively low coverage limits—
may be a common strategy.  See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 1889–90.  If this intuition were 
accurate, it is still not clear how much more corporate shareholders would spend if they faced the threat of 
personal liability for unreasonably low insurance coverage.  In any event, it could be argued that this increase 
in the cost of doing business is justified on distributional grounds (shifting the cost of accidents from victims 
to shareholders) if limited liability’s main objective is to protect shareholders from liability for claims of 
unexpectedly large magnitude. 
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The Radaszewski case illustrates reliance on insurance as a basis for 
financial responsibility in the tort context.194  The plaintiff sustained serious 
injuries when he was hit by a truck driven by an employee of Contrux, a 
subsidiary of Telecom Corporation.195  The corporate tortfeasor was thinly 
capitalized; the parent had provided most of its capital in the form of debt 
rather than equity, and the subsidiary apparently operated in a way that did not 
allow it to retain its own earnings.196  The court of appeals aptly characterized 
its balance sheet as “anemic.”197  Applying its interpretation of the case law, 
the district court concluded that Contrux’s undercapitalization warranted veil 
piercing.198  The court of appeals disagreed, emphasizing that Contrux had 
provided compensation for the plaintiff’s injury by purchasing a liability 
insurance policy worth $11,000,000.199  The appellate court correctly rejected 
the view that shareholders’ limited liability should depend on mechanical 
analysis of the corporation’s balance sheet.200  Instead, the relevant question 
should be whether the corporate shareholder responded to a known business 
risk in a responsible manner.201  “If the subsidiary is financially responsible, 
whether by means of insurance or otherwise, the policy behind [the state’s veil-
piercing rule] is met.  Insurance meets this policy just as well, perhaps even 
better, than a healthy balance sheet.”202 
The Radaszewski case also illustrates another benefit of a rule that has the 
effect of requiring insurance against likely tort claims.  Liability insurance 
makes it possible for groups of actors engaged in the same kind of risky 
activity to share the costs of losses that actually occur.  In contrast, if limited 
liability is overly broad, the result is concentration of such costs on individual 
 
 194 Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying Missouri law). 
 195 Id. at 306. 
 196 Id. at 308. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. at 310. 
 200 Id. at 310–11. 
 201 Id. at 310. 
 202 Id. at 309.  In the Radaszewski case, the corporate tortfeasor’s insurance carrier actually became 
insolvent some two years after the accident that injured the plaintiff.  Insurance can be available to cover 
accidents that have already occurred, but, understandably, it tends to be very expensive.  Should the financial 
responsibility idea be interpreted to require purchase of insurance after the initial carrier’s insolvency?  The 
question bears further analysis, but it would seem that the policy justifications for requiring the shareholders to 
obtain liability insurance in advance of readily anticipated accidents would not necessarily apply to situations 
in which it turns out that, after the fact, the corporation is unable to provide compensation because of an 
insurance carrier’s insolvency.  A corporation that acts responsibly toward potential tort victims by purchasing 
insurance should not find itself liable as a result of an unexpected event of this kind.  The issue would be 
otherwise if, at the time a policy is purchased, there is reason to doubt an insurance company’s solvency. 
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injured parties, with potentially crushing results.  It is unclear whether 
imposing responsibility on business owners will actually reduce risk because 
the availability of insurance can increase the probability or the magnitude of 
losses from risky behavior.203  Even so, however, the distributional benefit is 
apparent. 
2. Example: The Walkovszky Case 
Some states have statutory minimum liability insurance requirements for 
particular kinds of business activity, especially those involving motor 
vehicles.204  Federal law similarly mandates minimum insurance coverage for 
motor carriers operated in interstate commerce.205  Some have argued that 
compliance with statutory requirements should be sufficient to defeat a veil-
piercing claim even if the amount of the loss far exceeds the policy limit.206  
Thinking about financial responsibility in the manner suggested here should 
provide ample reason to reject this argument. 
A well-known case in which this issue arose is Walkovszky v. Carlton.207  
The plaintiff, Walkovszky, was a pedestrian run down by a New York City taxi 
cab.208  The cab was owned by a corporation called Seon Cab Corporation that 
owned it and another cab.209  Carlton was a shareholder of Seon.210  He and his 
associates also owned nine other corporations each of which also owned but 
two cabs.211  Together these ten corporations were operated as a single 
business.212  Seon’s principal asset apparently was a $10,000 insurance policy, 
which was the minimum liability coverage required by New York law.213 
Walkovszky sued Seon and the nine other corporations on the theory that 
together they constituted a single “enterprise entity” and therefore ought to be 
 
 203 See generally POLINSKY, supra note 42, at 60–61 (discussing moral hazard problem). 
 204 See generally LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 19:4 (1997). 
 205 See 49 C.F.R. § 387 (2002) (requiring insurance coverage or surety bond sufficient to satisfy liability 
to third parties). 
 206 See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 219. 
 207 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966). 
 208 Id. at 7. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. 
 213 The vehicles themselves apparently were heavily mortgaged and their medallions were unavailable to 
satisfy a tort judgment.  See id. at 11 (Keating, J., dissenting). 
2007] PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 1379 
treated as such for liability purposes.214  This form of veil-piercing claim, 
which denies the separate entity status of the several corporations sharing 
common ownership, even if successful, probably would not have yielded 
adequate recovery.  Walkovszky therefore also pursued a different veil-
piercing theory, seeking to hold Carlton and Seon’s other shareholders 
personally liable.215  In this regard, he alleged undercapitalization and also that 
Carlton “organized, managed, dominated and controlled” this single fractured 
economic entity.216 
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the 
complaint for failure to state a claim.217  The court emphasized the lack of 
allegations that Carlton and the other shareholders were “actually doing 
business in their individual capacities, shuttling their personal funds in and out 
of the corporations ‘without regard to formality and to suit their immediate 
convenience.’”218  In addition, the court also stressed the fact that Seon had 
complied with the legislatively imposed insurance requirement: 
The corporate form may not be disregarded merely because the assets 
of the corporation, together with the mandatory insurance coverage 
of the vehicle which struck the plaintiff, are insufficient to assure him 
the recovery sought . . . .  [I]f the insurance coverage required by 
statute “is inadequate for the protection of the public, the remedy lies 
not with the courts but with the Legislature.”219 
In this court’s view, Seon’s controlling shareholder did not act 
irresponsibly, even though he had operated the corporation with assets clearly 
insufficient to meet tort claims that were virtually certain to occur.220  The fact 
that the corporation had complied with the state’s minimum insurance 
requirement was taken to indicate that the corporation and its shareholders had 
fully met their obligations to potential tort creditors.221 To impose additional 
 
 214 Id. at 8; see Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343 (1947). 
 215 Walkovszky, 223 N.E.2d at 8–9. 
 216 Id. at 9. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. at 10 (citation omitted).  After Walkovszky amended his complaint to reflect the court’s opinion, 
the defendants again moved for dismissal.  This time the motion was denied.  Walkovszky v. Carlton, 287 
N.Y.S.2d 546 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968), aff’d, 244 N.E.2d 55 (N.Y. 1968).  Thereafter the case presumably 
settled. 
 219 Walkovszky, 223 N.E.2d at 9 (quoting trial court opinion). 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. 
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liability on the shareholders was thought to amount to a usurpation of the 
legislature’s power to define financial responsibility in this context.222 
A court that takes seriously the idea of financial responsibility as the test 
for veil-piercing claims should not accept this argument.  Instead, it should 
simply ask whether those in control of a corporation have adequately planned 
for likely tort claims.  The fact that the corporation carries the minimum 
amount of insurance mandated by state law is not necessarily of any relevance 
to that question.  If the policy amount is insufficient to meet likely claims and 
other corporate assets cannot make up the deficiency, those in control of the 
corporation have acted irresponsibly. 
Statutory insurance minimums should be viewed as minimums and no 
more.  There are good reasons why a legislature might rationally impose low 
insurance minimums without believing that the amounts in question would be 
adequate to satisfy all claims that are reasonably likely to occur.  For example, 
the New York statute referred to in the Walkovszky case deals not only with 
taxicabs but also with any other business that “transport[s] passengers for hire 
in any motor vehicle or motorcycle . . . .”223  The risk attendant to the various 
kinds of activities falling under this broad category varies widely.  A New 
York City taxicab is far more likely to cause serious injury to a pedestrian than 
is a low-speed golf cart used to transport elderly residents of a rural retirement 
community.  A legislature unable to identify a single policy amount that will 
suit all the businesses subject to it would presumably err on the low side; 
requiring some businesses to overinsure raises their costs without any 
offsetting social benefit.  If that is the basis for a statutory amount, it makes no 
sense to conclude that a legislature intended that that amount fully satisfies the 
obligations of all businesses involved in the transportation of passengers.224  
The New York courts should have thought more seriously about whether the 
defendant shareholders managed this business in a financially responsible 
manner. 
 
 222 Id. 
 223 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 370(1) (McKinney 1996).  The current minimum for vehicles having a 
seating capacity of not more than seven persons is $25,000.  § 370(1)(a). 
 224 It is possible that the statute at issue in Walkovszky was written not for the benefit of third parties like 
Walkovszky who are injured by motor vehicles but instead was intended to protect their passengers.  See 
Green Bus Lines v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp., 39 N.E.2d 251 (N.Y. 1942).  If that is in fact the case, then 
compliance with the statute has no bearing at all on the question of the shareholders’ responsibility to people 
like Walkovszky. 
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CONCLUSION 
Piercing the corporate veil is a notoriously incoherent area of the law.  
Courts typically base their decisions on conclusory references to criteria of 
doubtful relevance.  Results are unpredictable.  This state of affairs is the result 
of doctrinal development lacking a clear understanding of the policy basis for 
limited liability.  In the absence of such an understanding, courts have been 
unable to distinguish in a principled way between situations in which the 
limited liability shield is appropriate and those in which it is not.  Instead they 
have relied on little more than vaguely articulated notions of unfairness and 
injustice dressed up in doctrine that is flexible enough to accommodate these 
intuitions.  The same impulses that have led courts to deny limited liability in 
the corporate context are now producing similar results in cases brought 
against the owners of newly sanctioned limited liability entities. 
Limited liability is best understood as a subsidy designed to encourage 
business investment.  Creditors of corporate debtors take on the risk of 
corporate insolvency that otherwise would fall upon the firm’s owners.  
Victims of corporate torts must bear their losses to the extent they exceed 
corporate assets.  Legislators thus view limited liability as a benefit conferred 
on business investors and assume that society is better off despite the costs.  
The subsidy effect is obvious as to tort creditors.  It is less obvious that 
shareholders actually gain value from contract creditors, who can insist on 
compensation ex ante for increased risk of default, but even in this context 
recent research in behavioral economics suggests that shareholders do benefit 
at creditors’ expense from the statutory limited liability default rule. 
However beneficial limited liability may be to corporate shareholders and 
to society more generally, it should not be so broad as to encompass 
illegitimate behavior.  In particular, limited liability should not provide the 
occasion for shareholders to behave opportunistically toward corporate 
creditors.  As to contract creditors, that means transfer of risk that creditors 
have not agreed to bear.  This can happen at the time an obligation is incurred 
if the controlling shareholders have no reasonable basis for believing that the 
debt will be repaid.  Opportunism can also take the form of actions that 
unreasonably increase the risk of default on existing obligations.  Tort creditors 
by definition have not dealt voluntarily with the corporation, and so there is no 
question of voluntary assumption.  In this context, shareholder opportunism 
involves deliberate or reckless imposition of risk without provision for 
compensation.  As to both contract and tort creditors, the key concern is with 
1382 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56 
controlling shareholders who use limited liability as a device deliberately or 
recklessly to extract value from third parties without their consent and without 
compensation; absent the limited liability shield, such practices could not be 
effective.  Fairness and efficiency considerations—especially the harmful 
impact on the cost of credit—necessitate denial of limited liability in such 
cases because the subsidy to investors comes at too great a cost to corporate 
creditors.  Limited liability should instead be limited to situations in which 
shareholders have managed the business with due regard for bargained-for 
expectations and potential victims of likely accidents.  If corporate insolvency 
has occurred despite the shareholders’ reasonable efforts, the limited liability 
shield should protect them.  In other words, the availability of limited liability 
should depend on whether the controlling shareholders have managed the 
business in a financially responsible manner. 
Veil piercing can provide the means for distinguishing legitimate from 
illegitimate reliance on statutory limited liability.  Both as to tort and contract 
creditors, judges confronted with veil-piercing claims need to ask how far 
corporate law’s limited liability shield should extend.  Should shareholders 
enjoy broad freedom to shift the costs of their business onto third parties, or 
should limited liability be restricted to cases in which shareholders have in 
good faith attempted to manage their business in a way that respects the 
interests of third parties?  If the latter, limited liability would protect 
controlling shareholders from responsibility for creditor losses that occur 
despite financially responsible management.  It would not extend to insolvency 
resulting from deliberate opportunism or unreasonable neglect.  Veil piercing 
thus allows courts to narrow the scope of limited liability to those 
circumstances in which it is warranted according to sound public policy.  If the 
veil-piercing mechanism were deployed in this way, it would protect business 
investors from the kinds of losses that should be their primary concern, namely 
business insolvency due to causes that the owners have no reasonable means to 
anticipate or prevent.  As such, limited liability would still provide investors 
with a significant benefit.  It would therefore continue to facilitate corporate 
law’s business subsidization policy, but the cost of that subsidy would be 
reduced to an amount that respects legitimate societal interests. 
 
